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Abstract
In a seminal paper, Becker (1968) showed that the most e¢ cient way to deter
crime is to impose the severest possible penalty (to maintain adequate deterrence)
with the lowest possible probability (to economize on costs of enforcement). We shall
call this the Becker proposition (BP). The BP is derived under the assumptions of
expected utility theory (EU). However, EU is heavily rejected by the evidence. A
range of non-expected utility theories have been proposed to explain the evidence.
The two leading alternatives to EU are rank dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative
prospect theory (CP). The main contributions of this paper are: (1) We formalize
the BP in a more satisfactory manner. (2) We show that the BP holds under RDU
and CP. (3) We give a formal behavioral approach to crime and punishment that
could have applicability to a wide range of problems in the economics of crime.
Keywords: Crime and punishment, non-linear weighting of probabilities, cumu-
lative prospect theory, rank dependent utility, probability weighting functions, pun-
ishment functions.
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+44-116-2522898. Fax: +44-116-2522908. E-mail: aa10@le.ac.uk."If the supply of o⁄enses depended only on pf￿ o⁄enders were risk neutral ￿ a re-
duction in p...would lower the loss...The loss would be minimized, therefore, by lowering p
arbitrarily close to zero and raising f su¢ ciently high so that the produce pf would induce
the optimal number of o⁄enses." Becker (1968, p. 183).
1. Introduction
In a seminal contribution, Becker (1968) opened the way to a rigorous formal economic
analysis of crime. Becker (1968) showed that the most e¢ cient way to deter a crime
is to impose the severest possible penalty with the lowest possible probability. We shall
call this the Becker proposition. The intuition is simple and compelling. By reducing the
probability of detection and conviction, society can economize on costs of enforcement such
as policing and trial costs. But by increasing the severity of the punishment (monetary
and non-monetary), the deterrence e⁄ect of the punishment is maintained.
The Becker proposition takes a particularly stark form if the decision maker follows
expected utility theory (EU) and if we add two assumptions: (1) Risk neutrality or risk aver-
sion. (2) The availability of in￿nitely severe (monetary and non-monetary) punishments,
e.g., capital punishment. With these extra assumptions, the Becker proposition implies
that crime would be deterred completely, however small the probability of detection and
conviction, as illustrated in Becker￿ s quote at the beginning.1 Kolm (1973) memorably
phrased this as hang o⁄enders with probability zero.
The Becker proposition (BP) has had a tremendous impact on the economics and law
literature and it introduced a formal economic approach to crime.2 The BP has spawned
a great deal of literature that typically relaxes some assumption behind the BP or embeds
the BP within a more complex setting in order to see if the BP holds.
1.1. How robust is the BP?
The BP might not hold for a variety of reasons. For instance, criminals could be risk-
seeking (Becker, 1968). In￿nite ￿nes could be di¢ cult to collect due to bankruptcy con-
straints (Friedman, 1999; Polinsky and Shavell, 1991). Because of the danger of falsely
convicting an innocent person (a Type-I error), society could face huge welfare losses from
large ￿nes (Andreoni, 1991; Feess and Wholschlegel, 2009; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000b).
High ￿nes might encourage rent-seeking behavior on the part of law-enforcers to collude
in acquitting criminals (Friedman, 1999). For reasons of norms and fairness society may
1In the quote, p is the probability of detection and conviction and f is the punishment (monetary and
non-monetary).
2The salience of the Becker proposition in that literature can be gauged from the fact that a Google
Scholar search shows that it has been cited 7050 times
2not accept the severe punishments required by the BP (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000a). Risk
averse criminals whose utility enters the social welfare function would be severely hit by
very high ￿nes in the event that they are caught, lowering social welfare (Polinsky and
Shavell,1979; Kaplow, 1992). Pathological criminals are not deterred by high ￿nes anyway
(Colman, 1995).
The extensions of the Becker proposition noted above have enriched the literature
and deepened our understanding of the economics of crime. Like Becker (1968), these
extensions use expected utility theory (EU), a decision theory whose predictions, as we
discuss below, are routinely refuted by the evidence .
Our ￿rst objective is to formalize the BP. Our second objective is to check for the
robustness of BP with respect to alternative decision theories that are better supported
by the evidence as compared to EU. The third objective of our paper is to outline a
formal behavioral approach to crime and punishment that can potentially have a range of
applications to related problems.
1.2. Expected utility theory, its refutations and the leading alternatives
A common feature of all the robustness tests of the BP brie￿ y outlined in subsection
1.1 above, is that they assume criminals follow expected utility theory (EU). Despite its
overwhelming popularity in the literature, EU has been strongly rejected by the evidence
gathered over several decades of research. The Allais paradox, in its common ratio and
common consequence forms, was an early demonstration of the violation of the indepen-
dence axiom of EU. Other well documented violations have included preference reversals,
violation of framing invariance, violation of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom,
violation of the dependence of utility on ￿nal wealth rather than wealth relative to a refer-
ence point (reference dependence), con￿ ation of risk aversion with loss aversion, attitudes
to risk that depend only on the shape of the utility function, unreasonable risk aversion
for large stake gambles if there is risk aversion over small stakes, qualitatively and quanti-
tatively incorrect results when pitted in a race with other decision theories, among many
others.3
EU has two salient features. (1) The objective function is linear in probabilities, and
(2) utility is de￿ned over ￿nal levels of wealth. For a range of problems, such as the Allais
paradox, it was found that the relaxation of linearity in probabilities provided a solution.
This lead to the development of several alternatives. According to Machina (2008) the
most popular of these alternatives is rank dependent utility (RDU), developed by Quiggin
(1982). However, RDU retains the second salient feature of EU, namely that utilities are
3The literature documenting violations of EU has assumed huge proportions. Comprehensive reviews of
the violation of EU can be found in Kahneman and Tversky (2000), Starmer (2000), Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007, 2010b), Wakker (2010), Crawford and Meng (2011).
3de￿ned over ￿nal wealth levels. RDU can explain everything that EU can explain because
EU is a special case of RDU. But, in addition, RDU can explain a range of phenomena
that EU is unable to explain.
Empirical evidence arising from several economic phenomena demonstrates strongly,
and robustly, the following facts; see Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 2000), Starmer (2000)
and Wakker (2010). Individuals derive utility not from ￿nal wealth levels but changes in
wealth relative to a reference level (reference dependence).4 This partitions the domain of
outcomes into gains (when wealth exceeds the reference point) and the domain of losses
(when wealth is lower than the reference wealth). Individuals exhibit loss aversion, namely
the tendency for losses to bite more than equivalent gains. Furthermore, the utility func-
tion is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses (diminishing
sensitivity). We discuss these features in detail in section 6.
The award of the Nobel Prize to Daniel Kahneman was in recognition for joint work,
largely with Amos Tversky.5 They documented severe violations of EU and provided in
its place a successful alternative in the form of prospect theory (PT) also known as ￿rst
generation prospect theory. PT is described in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which is
the second most cited paper in economics since 1970 (see Dellavigna, 2009). In PT, both
salient features of EU, namely, linearity in probabilities and utility de￿ned over ￿nal wealth,
are relaxed. In particular, the second of these two salient features is relaxed by allowing
for reference dependence, loss aversion and declining sensitivity. All these features of PT
are based on strong experimental evidence. This work was followed by second generation
prospect theory, also known as cumulative prospect theory (CP) in Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), who incorporated insights from Quiggin￿ s work on RDU into PT (see section 6
below). In conjunction, PT and CP are able to address most of the shortcomings of EU
brie￿ y mentioned in the opening paragraph of this subsection.
Many economic phenomena require reference dependence, loss aversion and declining
sensitivity as essential components. As one might expect, EU and RDU typically do
not perform well in the domain of these economic phenomena while PT and CP do far
better. The range of such phenomena is very wide and important. In the context of
criminal activity, speci￿cally tax evasion, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) show that the
predictions of EU are both quantitatively incorrect (by up to 100 fold) and qualitatively
incorrect.6 This raises great di¢ culty in applying EU to empirical or theoretical work in
4In a classic experiment from psychology an individual is asked to dip one hand (hand L) in hot water
and another hand (hand R) in cold water. Once the hands become attuned to the respective temperatures,
both hands are taken out simultaneously and dipped in lukewarm water. Hand L reports the lukewarm
water to be cold while hand R reports the lukewarm water to be hot.
5Daniel Kahneman won the 2002 Nobel prize in Economics. Sadly, Amos Tversky died in 1996 and
there is no provision to receive the Nobel prize postumously.
6The qualitative incorrectness in this case refers to the Yitzhaki puzzle. Under plausible attitudes to
4economics. By contrast, the evidence is easily explained by CP. Camerer (2000) documents
the superior performance of PT/CP for a range of phenomena that include the disposition
e⁄ect, asymmetric price elasticities, the excess sensitivity of consumption to income, the
equity premium puzzle, elasticities of labour supply and asset pricing, among others.7
CP can explain everything that EU and RDU can, but the converse is false, hence, CP
is the most satisfactory decision theory among the leading alternatives. Indeed, EU and
RDU are special cases of CP. Furthermore, CP is very tractable in actual applications. The
continued use of EU in the face of ever mounting refutations, better developed, equally
tractable and equally rigorous alternative theories that conform much better with the
evidence is one of the great puzzles in the economics profession. We do not assume a
knowledge of RDU and CP on the part of the reader in this paper. The relevant concepts
are developed during the paper when needed.
1.3. Research problems, results and some implications
The BP has been extended in several directions (see subsection 1.1 above), yet the analysis
has steadfastly continued to assume EU in most cases despite EU having faced intense
refutations for several decades. We ￿nd this puzzling and surprising.8 A major research
aim of our paper is to test if the BP holds under RDU and CP. We ￿nd that the BP is
robust to a consideration of alternative mainstream decision theories. In particular, we
￿nd that the BP holds for RDU as well as for CP. We also provide a clearer derivation of
the BP under EU. A related contribution of our paper is that by addressing a basic crime
and punishment problem in a non-expected utility framework, it opens up the way for a
consideration of other problems and issues using our framework.
Our ￿ndings have mixed implication for alternative explanations of the violations of
the BP outlined brie￿ y in subsection 1.1 above. On the one hand, our ￿ndings strengthen
these alternative explanations because if the BP is violated, it is not on account of a refuted
theory, namely, EU. We show that the BP continues to hold under RDU and CP, theories
which are con￿rmed much better by the evidence. In this sense, the research program
for alternative explanations was fortuitously headed in the right direction. On the other
hand, because the alternative explanations themselves continued to use EU, it might be
risk, EU predicts that when the tax rate increases, taxpayers will evade less. In the limit when the tax
rate is a 100%, all income is declared. This contradicts the bulk of evidence; see Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007) for the details.
7The interested reader can also consult Kahneman and Tversky (2000), the Nobel lecture by Kahneman
(2003) and a review of ￿eld studies in Dellavigna (2009).
8Neilson and Winter (1997) make an attempt to apply RDU to a problem of crime but their intention
was not to see if BP holds under RDU. They were interested in showing that even if individuals violate
EU they could still be risk averse. A much more complete treatment of attitudes to risk under RDU,
arising as the product of the shapes of the utility function and the probability weighting function can be
found in Wakker (2010).
5worthwhile to re-examine them in the light of RDU and CP to check if they continue to
hold. The latter remark is not purely speculative. In the context of the criminal activity
of tax evasion, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007, 2010), show that EU gives results that are
qualitatively incorrect and quantitatively incorrect.
1.4. Organization of the paper
Section 2 formulates a standard economic model of crime. The Becker proposition is
considered under EU in Section 3. Section 4 gives a brief discussion of probability weighting
functions, with particular emphasis on the Prelec (1998) function. Section 5 shows that
the Becker proposition holds under RDU and Section 6 shows it also holds under CP. We
consider ￿xed reference points in subsection 6.2, while subsection 6.3 allows for a wider
range of reference points as well as heterogeneity among criminals. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The model and assumptions
Suppose that an individual receives income, y0, from being engaged in some legal activity
and income, y1, y1 > y0, from being engaged in some illegal activity. Hence, the bene￿t,
b, to the perpetrator from the illegal activity is
b = y1 ￿ y0 > 0. (2.1)
If engaged in the illegal activity, the individual is caught with some probability p, 0 ￿
p ￿ 1. If caught, the individual is asked to pay a ￿ne, F. As in much of the existing
literature, particularly Becker (1968), we use the simplifying assumption that F is the
monetary equivalent of all punishments.9 We assume that,
F 2 [0;1]. (2.2)
In particular, it is feasible to levy a ￿ne at least equal to the bene￿t from crime, b. This
is true of Examples 1 - 3 that we give below, consistent with real world practice and is an
assumption that is made in standard models of crime and punishment; see, for instance,
Polinsky and Shavell (2007). Given the enforcement parameters p, F, the individual makes
only one choice, to commit the crime or not.
This framework nests several important settings. Consider the following examples.
9Thus, we are assuming that it is possible to impute a monetary value to all possible kinds of punish-
ments such as incarceration, loss of reputation, naming and shaming etc. While this is not innocuous, it
simpli￿es the analysis substantially.
6Example 1 (Theft/robbery): Engaging in theft gives a monetary reward b ￿ 0. If the
thief is caught (with probability p ￿ 0) the goods, whose value is b, are impounded and,
in addition, the o⁄ender pays a ￿ne, f ￿ 0 (or faces other penalties such as imprisonment
whose equivalent monetary value is f). Hence, F = b + f.
Example 2 (Tax evasion): Consider the following widely used model (Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972). A taxpayer has taxable incomes z1 > 0 and z2 > 0 from two economic
activities, both of which are taxed at the rate t > 0. Income z1 cannot be evaded (for
instance, it could be wage income with the tax withheld at source). However, the individual
can choose to evade or declare income z2.10 It follows that y0 = (1 ￿ t)(z1 + z2). Suppose
that the taxpayer chooses to evade income z2. Hence, y1 = (1 ￿ t)z1 + z2 > y0 and the
bene￿t from tax evasion is b = tz2 ￿ 0. If caught evading, the individual is asked to pay
back the tax liabilities owed, b = tz2, and an additional ￿ne f = ￿tz2 where ￿ > 0 is the
penalty rate. Hence, F = (1 + ￿)tz2.
Example 3 (Pollution): Consider a ￿rm that produces a ￿xed output that is sold for a
pro￿t, ￿. As a by-product, and conditional on the ￿rm￿ s existing technology, the ￿rm
creates a level of emissions, E, that is greater than the legal limit, E. With probability
p ￿ 0 the ￿rm￿ s emissions are audited by the appropriate regulatory authority. Emissions
can be reduced at a cost of c > 0 per unit by making changes to existing technology.








￿ 0 is the bene￿t arising










We have not speci￿ed the preferences of the individual, yet. In subsequent sections we
shall consider, sequentially, the possibilities that the decision maker has expected utility
(EU), rank dependent utility (RDU), and cumulative prospect theory (CP) preferences.
2.1. The social costs of crime and law enforcement
Let C (p;F) ￿ 0 be the cost to society of law enforcement. Let D(p;F) be the damage
to society caused by crime. We assume that C (0;0) = 0, i.e., in the absence of any law
enforcement, costs of such enforcement are zero. If crime is deterred completely by p = p0
and F = F0 then, we assume, D(p0;F0) = 0.
We also assume that C and D are continuous functions of p and F with continuous
￿rst and second partial derivatives11, i.e., C;D 2 C2. We denote partial derivatives with
10Examples include income from several kinds of ￿nancial assets, domestic work, private tuition, private
rent, income from overseas, among many others. In actual practice, tax evasion often takes the form of
completely hiding certain taxable activities; see Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
11Cn is the class of continuous functions with continuous partial derivatives up to order n.
7subscripts, e.g., Cp = @C
@p and CpF = @2C
@p@F . We assume that
Cp > 0, CF ￿ 0. (2.3)
Thus, the cost of law enforcement can be reduced by reducing the probability of de-
tection and conviction, p. In general, an increase in the punishment, F, will increase the
cost of law enforcement (for example, increasing the length of prison sentences). We note,
for future reference, a special case below.
De￿nition 1 (Ideal ￿ne): The case CF = 0 can be thought of as that of an ideal ￿ne,
which has a ￿xed administrative cost and involves a transfer from the o⁄ender to the victim
or society (so there is no aggregate loss to society other than the ￿xed administrative cost).
2.2. Society￿ s objective
Let
T (p;F) = C (p;F) + D(p;F), (2.4)
be the total cost to society of crime. We assume that
[TF]F=0 < 0. (2.5)
Society aims to choose the instruments p and F so as to minimize T (p;F). The
condition in (2.5) ensures that total costs can be reduced by raising the ￿ne just above
zero, hence, F = 0 is not optimal.
2.3. A principal-agent interpretation of the model
We can also interpret this model more generally as that of a principal-agent relationship.
A principal contracts an agent to perform a certain task in exchange for the monetary
reward y0. The agent can either carry out his task honestly or can improperly exploit
the principal￿ s facilities to enhance his income to y1 > y0. This causes damage, D, to the
principal. The principal can introduce a monitoring technology and a system of sanctions
at a cost C (p;F). The total cost to the principal is, thus, T (p;F) = C (p;F) + D(p;F),
where p is the probability of detection and F is the sanction. The analogue of Becker￿ s
proposition, in this case, is to impose the severest sanction on the agent with the minimum
probability of detection, i.e., o⁄er, what Rasmusen (1994) calls, a boiling in oil contract.
2.4. Punishment functions
The objective of minimizing T (p;F) with respect to p;F can be broken down into two
stages. First, we ask whether, for each p, there is a level of punishment, F = ’(p), that
8minimizes T (p;’(p)) given p. If the existence of such an optimal punishment function is
assured, then we can ask whether there exists a probability, p, that minimizes T (p;’(p)).
Formal de￿nitions are given below. First, we de￿ne a punishment function (optimal or
otherwise), then we de￿ne an optimal punishment function.
De￿nition 2 (Punishment function): By a punishment function we mean a function
’(p) : [0;1] ! [0;1] that assigns to each probability of detection and conviction, p 2 [0;1],
a punishment ’(p) 2 [0;1].
Note that we allow for the possibility of in￿nite punishments, i.e., we allow for the
possibility that ’(p) = 1 for some p.
De￿nition 3 (Optimal punishment function): Let ’ : [0;1] ! [0;1] be a punishment
function. We call ’ an optimal punishment function if, for all p 2 [0;1] such that ’(p) < 1,
and for all F 2 [0;1), T (p;’(p)) ￿ T (p;F).
Proposition 1 (Existence of optimal punishment functions):
(a) An optimal punishment function, ’(p) : [0;1] ! [0;1], exists.
(b) If ’(p) < 1 then [TF (p;F)]F=’(p) = 0 and [TFF (p;F)]F=’(p) ￿ 0.







(d) If ’(p) < 1, [TFF (p;F)]F=’(p) > 0 and [TpF (p;F)]F=’(p) > 0 then ’0 (p) < 0.
De￿nition 4 (Cost and ￿ne elasticities): ￿C
p =
p
CCp is the probability elasticity of cost,
￿C
F = F





dp is the probability
elasticity of punishment.
Lemma 1 : d
dpC (p;’(p)) > 0 if, and only if, ￿C
p > ￿F
p ￿C




F is most likely to hold when the costs to society do not
increase too rapidly in response to an increase in ￿nes. It will be satis￿ed for an ideal ￿ne,
since ￿C
p > 0 and ￿C
F = 0 for an ideal ￿ne (see De￿nition 1).
2.5. The hyperbolic punishment function
A popular and tractable subset of ’(p) is the hyperbolic punishment function (HPF),
H(p).
De￿nition 5 : A hyperbolic punishment function, HPF is de￿ned by
H(p) = c=p. (2.6)
where c is a positive constant.
9The name derives from the fact that in p;F space, the HPF plots as a rectangular
hyperbola. Note that, for (2.6), ’(0) = 1. The justi￿cation for the hyperbolic punishment
function is considered in al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011a). The HPF has been widely used
in the law and economics ￿eld.12
3. The Becker proposition under expected utility theory (EU)
We now consider the Becker proposition (BP) under EU. One of the objectives of this
section is to give a more satisfactory formal treatment of the BP.13 Consider an individual
with continuously di⁄erentiable and strictly increasing utility of income, u.
If he does not engage in crime, his income is y0. In that case, his payo⁄from no-crime,
UNC, is given by UNC = u(y0). On the other hand, if the individual engages in crime, his
income is y1 if not caught, but y1 ￿F ￿ y1, if caught. Since he is caught with probability,
p, his expected utility from crime, EUC, is given by EUC = pu(y1 ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)u(y1).
The individual does not engage in crime if the no-crime condition (NCC) EUC ￿ UNC is
satis￿ed. Thus, the no-crime condition is
NCC: pu(y1 ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)u(y1) ￿ u(y0). (3.1)
Proposition 2 (Becker, 1968): Under EU, if the utility function is unbounded below, so
that u(y1 ￿ F) ! ￿1 as F ! 1, then, for any probability of punishment p > 0, no
matter how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently severe punishment, F.
We show in Proposition 3 below that (i) not only does the Becker proposition hold for
risk-neutral and risk averse criminals, (ii) its implementation is socially desirable because
it reduces the total cost of crime, T (p;F), for society.
Proposition 3 (Becker, 1968)14: Under EU,
(a) If the individual is risk neutral or risk averse, so that u is concave, then the HPF
’(p) = b
p will deter crime. It follows that given any probability of detection and conviction,
p > 0, no matter how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently large punishment.
(b) If, in addition, ￿C
p > ￿C
F (De￿nition 4), then reducing p reduces the total social cost of
crime and law enforcement, T (p;F).
12The following quote from Polinsky and Shavell (2007, footnote 16) testi￿es to the importance of the
HPF: ￿[The HPF] or its equivalent, was put forward by Bentham (1789, p.173), was emphasized by Becker
(1968), and has been noted by many others since then.￿
13In Becker (1968) the ￿rst order conditions are given with equality. When the optimum lies on the
boundary this poses obvious problems. An intuitive argument is then given in Becker (1968) to justify a
boundary solution. We provide the formal underpinning to Becker￿ s informal argument.
14While Proposition 3(a) is well known from Becker (1968), Proposition 3(b) is, as far as we know, a
new result.
10Example 4 : Consider the utility function u(y) = ￿e￿y. Note that u0 (y) = e￿y > 0;
u00 (y) = ￿e￿y < 0. From the second inequality, we see that this utility function exhibits
risk averse behavior. Hence, from Proposition 3 (a) it would be possible to deter crime,
however small the probability of detection and conviction.
In contrast to these results, Levitt (2004) argues ￿... given the rarity with which
executions are carried out in this country and the long delays in doing so, a rational
criminal should not be deterred by the threat of execution.￿That might well be true as
an empirical ￿nding. However, this empirical observation is certainly not consistent with
the decision maker following EU, under the conditions of Proposition 3. The probability
of capital punishment can be made arbitrarily small but it will certainly deter crime under
EU (Becker proposition).
4. Probability weighting functions (PWF)
All mainstream decision theory models that relax the ￿linearity in probabilities￿assump-
tion of EU, e.g., rank dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative prospect theory (CP),
have one thing in common. Namely, that the decision maker uses a probability weighting
function (PWF), denoted by w(p), that transforms probabilities, p.
De￿nition 6 : A probability weighting function (PWF) is a strictly increasing function
w : [0;1]
onto ￿! [0;1].
A simple proof, that we omit, can be used to derive the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 : A PWF, w(p), has the following properties: (a) w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1.
(b) w has a unique inverse, w￿1, and w￿1 is also a strictly increasing function from [0;1]
onto [0;1]. (c) w and w￿1 are continuous.
Since the Becker proposition hinges critically on the behavior of decision makers as
p ! 0, we now o⁄er some de￿nitions that establish the relevant terminology.




1. This is the sense in which a PWF is extremely steep as p ! 0.
De￿nition 8 (Standard probability weighting functions): We shall call the entire class of
probability weighting functions that satisfy De￿nition 7, for empirically relevant values of
￿, the class of standard probability weighting functions.
Some well known examples of standard probability weighting functions are Tversky
and Kahneman (1992), Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Lattimore, Baker and Witte (1992) and
Prelec (1998).
11Example 5 (Prelec￿ s probability weighting function): The Prelec (1998) probability weight-
ing function, w : [0;1]
onto ￿! [0;1], is one of the most popular and satisfactory probability
weighting functions. It is parsimonious, consistent with the stylized facts and has an
axiomatic foundation.15 It is given by w(0) = 0 and
w(p) = e
￿￿(￿lnp)￿
, 0 < p ￿ 1, 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿ > 0. (4.1)
The Prelec function is strictly concave for low probabilities but strictly convex for high
probabilities, i.e., it is inverse-S shaped as in w(p) = e￿(￿lnp)
1
2(￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 1), sketched
in Figure 4.1 as the bold curve. In Figure 4.1, the point of in￿ ection is on the 45o line.
This arises because ￿ = 1.16 Furthermore, it can be easily shown that in the special case
￿ = ￿ = 1; we get w(p) = p, as under expected utility theory.














Figure 4.1: The Prelec function w(p) = e￿(￿lnp)
1
2.
Proposition 5 : (a) The Prelec function (Example 5) is a probability weighting function
in the sense of De￿nition 6.
(b) For all ￿ > 0, the Prelec function (Example 5) in￿nitely overweights in￿nitesimal
probabilities (De￿nition 7), i.e., lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1. Thus, the Prelec function is a standard
probability weighting function (De￿nition 8).
15For the axiomatic foundations, see Prelec (1998) and al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2006).
16For ￿ < 1 the in￿ ection point is above the 45o line while for ￿ > 1 the in￿ ection point is below the
45o line. The interested reader can consult al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011b) for further details on these and
other related issues on the Prelec function.
12The bulk of the empirical evidence points to individuals having an inverse-S shaped
weighting function (as in the bold curve in Figure 4.1). Extensive empirical evidence for
this stylized fact is described in Wakker (2010). From Proposition 5, and as illustrated
in Figure 4.1, the Prelec function is consistent with this stylized fact.17 According to
Prelec (1998, p.505), the in￿nite limit in De￿nition 7, and Proposition 5(b), captures the
qualitative change as we move from improbability to impossibility.
5. The Becker paradox under rank dependent expected utility
Expected utility has two main features. It is (i) linear in probabilities, and (ii) utility is
de￿ned over ￿nal wealth levels. The refutations of EU have lead to the relaxation of both
these features. The most common relaxation has been to relax linearity in probabilities.
This was motivated initially by the inability of EU to explain various versions of the Allais
paradox arising from a violation of the independence axiom. The main alternative to EU
in decision theory that arose from work in this direction is rank dependent expected utility
(RDU). Machina (2008) describes RDU as the most popular alternative to EU.
The objective function under RDU is described in De￿nition 9, below. We follow it up
with an explanation.
De￿nition 9 (Quiggin 1982) Consider the lottery (x1;p1;x1;p1;:::;xn;pn) that pays some
monetary amount, xi, with probability, pi, where x1 ￿ x2 ￿ ::: ￿ xn. For RDU, the














where w is a standard probability weighting function (see De￿nition 8). The decision
maker￿ s rank dependent utility, RDU, is
RDU (x1;p1;x1;p1;:::;xn;pn) = ￿
n
j=1￿ju(xj). (5.2)
RDU o⁄ers a huge improvement over EU in terms of predictive success. The main dif-
ference between (5.2) and expected utility is that RDU replaces probabilities with decision
weights. With this modi￿cation to EU, RDU can explain everything that EU can, but the
converse is false (e.g., RDU can explain the Allais paradox while EU cannot).18 The con-
struction of decision weights in (5.1) shows the sense in which cumulative transformations
17The interested reader can consult al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011b) for more details.
18More formally, to see that EU is a special case of RDU, take the probability weighting function to
be w(p) = p. Then, from (5.1), we get ￿i = pi. From (5.2) we then get RDU (x1;p1;x1;p1;:::;xn;pn) =
￿n
j=1pju(xj), which is the EU objective function.
13of probabilities are made under RDU. This ensures that stochastically dominated choices
are never made by the decision maker; see Quiggin (1982).19
The decision weights in (5.1) may look complicated but they are actually very intuitive.
It can be shown that if, for instance, the probability weighting function is convex (concave)
throughout then a decision maker who uses (5.1) places much greater (smaller) decision
weight on smaller outcomes as compared to larger outcomes. Such a decision maker appears
to an outside observer as pessimistic (optimistic).20 Thus, while (5.1) may appear to be
cognitively challenging, it encapsulates simple psychological principles.
Almost all versions of RDU use standard probability weighting functions (De￿nition 8
and Proposition 5b).
Consider the model of crime in Section 2 and assume that the decision maker uses RDU.
Using De￿nition 9, the payo⁄from no-crime, the non-risky activity, is UNC = u(y0), while
that from crime is
EUC = [1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u(y1 ￿ F) + w(1 ￿ p)u(y1). (5.3)
Hence, the no-crime condition (NCC), RDUC ￿ UNC, holds if, and only if,
[1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u(y1 ￿ F) + w(1 ￿ p)u(y1) ￿ u(y0). (5.4)
Proposition 6 : (a) Under RDU, if the utility function is unbounded below, so that
u(y1 ￿ F) ! ￿1 as F ! 1, then, for any probability of punishment, p > 0, no matter
how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently severe punishment, F. In other words,
the Becker proposition holds.
Proposition 7 : Under RDU and for any PWF, w(p):
(a) If the utility function, u, is concave, then, given any p > 0, no matter how small, crime
is deterred by choosing the punishment function ’(p) = b
1￿w(1￿p), and




F (De￿nition 4 and Lemma 1), then reducing p reduces
the total social cost of crime and law enforcement, T (p;F).
Lemma 2 : The NCC (5.4) can be rewritten as:
￿(p;F) ￿ u(y0), (5.5)
where
￿(p;F) = [1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u(y1 ￿ F) + w(1 ￿ p)u(y1). (5.6)
￿(p;F) is continuous in p and F for all p;F with partial derivatives ￿p(p;F) < 0, for all
F and p, and ￿F(p;F) ￿ 0, for all F and p, where the latter inequality is strict for p > 0.
19This solved an important problem with Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1979) prospect theory. Indeed
it was the incorporation of this insight that was the major impetus to Tversky and Kahneman￿ s (1992)
second generation prospect theory, which is known as cumulative prospect theory (CP).
20See Wakker (2010) for the details.
14We now give some comparative static e⁄ects of the policy instruments, p;F, for the
case of RDU in the Proposition below.
Proposition 8 : Suppose that the utility function is unbounded below, so that u(y1 ￿ F) !
￿1 as F ! 1. Then:
(a) For every F > b, there exists some p = pc 2 (0;1) such that for all p ￿ pc decision
makers choose the legal activity and for all p < pc they choose the illegal activity.
(b) For p > 0, there exists some F = Fc such that for all F ￿ Fc decision makers choose
the legal activity and for all F < Fc they choose the illegal activity.
6. The Becker proposition under cumulative prospect theory (CP)
6.1. An introduction to CP
Recall from the introduction to section 5 that RDU relaxes the assumption of linearity
in probabilities. However, like EU, RDU continues to assume that decision makers derive
utility from ￿nal levels of wealth. By contrast, a range of empirical evidence that has a
rich history in psychology and has been robustly con￿rmed in thousands of experiments
shows that decision makers behave in the following manner.21 (i) They derive utility from
changes in wealth relative to some reference point and not ￿nal wealth levels (reference
dependence). This partitions the domain of outcomes into the domain of gains and the
domain of losses relative to the reference point. (ii) Losses bite more than equivalent gains
(loss aversion). (iii) The utility function is concave in the domain of gains but convex in
the domain of losses (declining sensitivity). Hence, in each domain there is diminished
sensitivity to a move away from the reference point.
We now outline cumulative prospect theory (CP), the second generation of prospect
theory due to Tversky and Kahneman (1992). CP is rigorous, has axiomatic foundations,
is consistent with much of the evidence and has better explanatory power relative to EU
and RDU.22 Consider a lottery of the form
L = (y￿m;p￿m;y￿m+1;p￿m+1;:::;y￿1;p￿1;y0;p0;y1;p1;:::;yn;pn),
where y￿m ￿ ::: ￿ y0 ￿ ::: ￿ yn are the outcomes, possibly wealth levels, and p￿m;:::;pn
are the corresponding probabilities, such that
Pn
i=￿m pi = 1 and pi ￿ 0. The reference
point for wealth is denoted by y0.23 Thus, we have m outcomes in the domain of losses
21See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Starmer (2000), Wakker (2010), al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011b).
22Readers interested in the axiomatic developments can follow up the references in Wakker (2010). The
empirical success of CP is highlighted and described in several places; see for instance Kahneman and
Tvesky (2000), Starmer (2000) and Wakker (2010).
23y0 could be initial wealth, status-quo wealth, average wealth, desired wealth, rational expectations
of future wealth etc. depending on the context. See Kahneman and Tversky (2000), K￿szegi and Rabin
(2006), and Schmidt et al. (2008).
15and n outcomes in the domain of gains for a total of m + n + 1 outcomes.
In CP, decision makers derive utility from wealth relative to a reference point for wealth,
y0. In order to capture this fact, we de￿ne lotteries in incremental form (also sometimes
known as ￿prospects￿ ; hence, the name ￿prospect theory￿ ).
De￿nition 10 (Lotteries in incremental form or ￿ prospects￿ ) Let xi = yi￿y0;i = ￿m;:::;n
be the increment in wealth relative to y0 when the outcome is yi and x￿m ￿ ::: ￿ x0 =
0 ￿ ::: ￿ xn. Then, a lottery in incremental form (or a prospect) is:
L = (x￿m;p￿m;x￿m+1;p￿m+1;:::;x￿1;p￿1;x0;p0;x1;p1;:::;xn;pn). (6.1)
Denote by LP the set of all prospects of the form given in (6.1).
Remark 1 : An outcome is in the domain of gains if xi ￿ 0 and in the domain of losses
if xi ￿ 0. Thus, the reference outcome, x0 = 0 is in both domains.
De￿nition 11 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). A utility function, v(x), under CP is a
continuous, strictly increasing, mapping v : R ! R that satis￿es:
1. v (0) = 0 (reference dependence).
2. v (x) is concave for x ￿ 0 (declining sensitivity for gains).
3. v (x) is convex for x ￿ 0 (declining sensitivity for losses).24
4. ￿v (￿x) > v (x) for x > 0 (loss aversion, e.g., a loss of $1 is more painful than the gain
of $1 is pleasurable).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose the following utility function which has di⁄erent
shapes in the domain of gains and loss.
v (x) =
￿
x￿ if x ￿ 0
￿￿(￿x)
￿ if x < 0 , (6.2)
where ￿;￿;￿ are constants. The coe¢ cients of the power function satisfy 0 < ￿ < 1,
0 < ￿ < 1. ￿ ￿ 1 is known as the coe¢ cient of loss aversion. The utility function in
(6.2) ￿ts well the data in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
estimated that ￿ ’ ￿ ’ 0:88 and ￿ ’ 2:25. This utility function also has an axiomatic
foundation.25
24Concavity in the domain of gains and convexity in the domain of losses does not mean, however, that
the decision maker is risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. The
reason is that attitudes to risk are also in￿ uenced by the shape of the probability weighting function. See,
for instance, the four-fold classi￿cation of risk outlined in Kahneman and Tversky (2000). See Wakker
(2010) for a formal textbook treatment.
25Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assert (but do not prove) that the axiom of preference homogeneity
((x;p) ￿ y ) (kx;p) ￿ ky) generates the value function in (6.2). al-Nowaihi et al. (2008) give a formal
proof, as well as some other results (e.g. that ￿ is necessarily identical to ￿).
16We now show how the decision weights are constructed under CP. This is the analogue
of the construction of decision weights under RDU (see De￿nition 9). The main di⁄erence
from RDU, in this respect, is that under CP, one computes decision weights separately
in the domain of gains and losses. In principle, one could use a probability weighting
function, w+, for the domain of gains and a di⁄erent weighting function, w￿, for the
domain of losses. However, the empirical evidence indicates that these functions are very
similar so, as in Prelec (1998), we set w+ = w￿ = w.26
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, j = ￿m;:::;￿1.
As in RDU, w is a standard probability weighting function (see De￿nition 8).
De￿nition 13 (Value function): A decision maker using CP maximizes the following value
function de￿ned over LP,
V (L) = ￿
n
i=￿m￿iv (xi), L 2 LP. (6.3)
where the utility function, v, is de￿ned in De￿nition 11 and the decision weights are de￿ned
in De￿nition 12.
6.2. Fixed reference points and ￿xed punishment levels
Let the reference incomes for crime and no-crime, be respectively, yc and ync, assumed
to be ￿xed in this subsection.27 Then, using reference dependence, the payo⁄ from not
committing crime is
VNC = v (y0 ￿ ync). (6.4)
26Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui et al. (2005) ￿nd that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the
curvature of the weighting function for gains and losses. For the Prelec function (see Example 5), we
know that the parameter ￿ controls the curvature. However, the elevation (which in the Prelec function is
controlled by the parameter ￿) can be di⁄erent in the domain of gains and losses. Empirically, however,
it appears that ￿ = 1 or is very close to 1.
27In the original version of CP, in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the reference point is ￿xed. In their
third generation prospect theory, denoted by PT3, Schmidt et al. (2008) suggest using state-dependent
reference points. However, the model by Schmidt et al. (2008) relies on reference dependent subjective
expected utility of Sugden (2003) and so PT3 is linear in probabilities (as is, of course, EU). Thus, PT3
cannot address the inverse S-shape of the probability weighting function. For that reason we do not follow
PT3, but we exploit it￿ s insight of using state dependent reference points in section 6.3.
17Recall that the outcomes under CP are split into the domain of gains and losses.28 We
make the plausible assumption that the decision maker who commits a crime is in the
domain of gains if not caught and in the domain of losses if caught. Thus, if caught (with
probability p), the outcome, y1 ￿ F, is in the domain of losses (i.e., y1 ￿ F ￿ yc ￿ 0).
If not caught (with probability 1 ￿ p), the outcome, y1, is in the domain of gains (i.e.,
y1 ￿ yc ￿ 0). Thus, we have one outcome each in the domain of losses and gains.29 Using
De￿nition 12, the respective decision weights are w(p) and w(1 ￿ p).30 Then, under CP,
the individual￿ s payo⁄ from committing a crime is given by
VC = w(p)v (y1 ￿ F ￿ yc) + w(1 ￿ p)v(y1 ￿ yc): (6.5)
The no crime condition (NCC) in the case of CP is VC ￿ VNC, which is equivalent to
w(p)v (y1 ￿ F ￿ yc) + w(1 ￿ p)v(y1 ￿ yc) ￿ v (y0 ￿ ync). (6.6)
From (6.6), ceteris-paribus, an increase in ￿nes, F, reduces the LHS and so makes it more
likely for the NCC to be satis￿ed. Hence, as one would expect, an increase in ￿nes reduces
crime.
The NCC depends on the two reference points, ync and yc, assumed ￿xed in this section.
Section 6.3 considers alternative speci￿cations of reference incomes drawing on the work
of Schmidt et al. (2008) and K￿szegi and Rabin (2006).
Proposition 9 : Assume CP with ￿xed reference points, ync and yc, and a utility function
v that is unbounded below, so that v (y1 ￿ F ￿ yc) ! ￿1 as F ! 1, ((6.2) for example).
Then, given a probability of detection, p > 0, no matter how small crime can be deterred
with a su¢ ciently high punishment, F. Thus, the Becker proposition holds under CP.
Under the conditions of Proposition 9, the Becker proposition holds under CP. The
reader might wonder if this result is due to the special assumption of ￿xed reference
points. In subsection 6.3, below, we show that the Becker proposition is robust enough to
survive a relaxation of this restriction.
6.3. Alternative speci￿cations of reference points under CP
The result (Proposition 9) in subsection 6.2, above, assumed ￿xed reference points. We
now relax this assumption. We make four assumptions, A1-A4, in this subsection.
28It is possible to have all outcomes in the domain of gains or all outcomes in the domain of losses but
this is not the case for our problem.
29In the context of tax evasion, Example 2, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007, 2010), show that the legal
after-tax income is the unique reference point such that for all levels of declared income, the taxpayer is
in the domain of loss if caught and in the domain of gains if not caught.
30In the special case of one outcome each in the domain of gains and losses, point transformations of
probabilities coincide with cumulative transformations.
181. Assumption A1 (Hyperbolic Punishment function, HPF): The punishment function
is the hyperbolic punishment function, F = ’(p) = b=p (see De￿nition 5), where
b = y1 ￿ y0 is the bene￿t from crime to the perpetrator.
2. Assumption A2 (Power form of utility): We use the utility function in (6.2) with
￿ = ￿ (as already noted, this is consistent with the evidence and has axiomatic
foundations).
3. Assumption A3 (Standard probability weighting functions): The weighting function
w(p) is a standard weighting function (see De￿nition 8) and so lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1 (e.g., the
Prelec (1998) function, Example 5), which is consistent with the empirically observed
inverse-S shape of a probability weighting function.
4. Assumption A4 (Heterogeneity in reference points): To enable a formulation that
nests several interesting cases, we describe the reference incomes from crime and no-
crime as follows. Take the reference income from crime, yc, as the expected income
from crime, i.e.,
yc = y1 ￿ p’(p). (6.7)
The reference income from no-crime, ync, is speci￿ed as some fraction, ￿ ￿ 0, of the
reference income from crime, i.e.,
ync = ￿yc = ￿(y1 ￿ p’(p));￿ ￿ 0, (6.8)




, ￿ > 1. This is the only source of individual heterogeneity in the model.
We now analyze our model of crime when the decision maker uses CP and Assumptions
1-4 hold.
Using Assumption 1, for the HPF, ’(p) = b=p. Using (2.1) we get that
p’(p) = b = y1 ￿ y0. (6.9)
Using (6.9), the reference incomes, yc, ync, in (6.7) and (6.8) are
yc = y1 ￿ p’(p) = y0, ync = ￿yc = ￿y0. (6.10)
Thus,
y0 ￿ ync = y0 ￿ ￿y0 = (1 ￿ ￿)y0. (6.11)
Depending on the value of ￿, we get three important cases.
19(i) Socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1): In this case, from (6.11) we get
(1 ￿ ￿)y0 > 0, i.e., income relative to the reference point from not committing
the crime is positive. Such an individual feels positively rewarded on account of his
honesty.
(ii) Regretful individuals (1 < ￿ ￿ ￿): In this case (6.11) implies that (1 ￿ ￿)y0 < 0.
Such an individual experiences regret from not committing the crime and having to
forego the higher income from crime.
(iii) Individuals with reference income equal to the rational expectation of income (￿ =
1): The recent literature has suggested that the reference point could be the rational
expectation of income, which in this perfect foresight model equals the expected
income level.31 By direct calculation, the expected income from no-crime is y0 while
the expected income fromcrime is y1￿p’(p). From (6.10), this corresponds to a value
of ￿ = 1. Thus, for the case of rational expectations of income we get yc = ync = y0.
Proposition 10 : Suppose that the decision maker follows CP and Assumptions 1-4 hold.
Then the Becker proposition holds for all three kinds of decision makers, namely, socially
responsible, regretful and those who have rational expectations.
We have argued that CP is the most satisfactory decision theory among the main-
stream alternatives. It can explain everything that EU (or its variants such as generalized
expected utility) or RDU can explain but the converse is false. Proposition 10 demon-
strates the resilience of the Becker proposition even when the decision maker follows CP
and a su¢ ciently wide range of reference point behaviors is allowed for.
6.4. Loss aversion and the extent of crime
An important consideration in models of crime has been the e⁄ect of risk aversion on
the decision to commit a crime. In RDU and CP, however, one cannot infer the degree
of risk aversion simply from the magnitude of the parameter ￿ in the utility function in
(6.2). The reason is that under EU, which is characterized by linearity in probabilities, risk
attitudes are captured entirely by the shape of the utility function. For instance, under
EU, concavity of utility implies and is implied by risk aversion.
By contrast, when linearity in probabilities is relaxed, as in RDU and CP (see De￿n-
itions 9 and 12), then risk aversion is determined jointly by the shape of the probability
weighting function and the shape of the utility function. Indeed in CP it can be shown that
31See, for instance, Koszegi and Rabin (2006), Crawford and Meng (2011).
20there is a rich four-fold pattern of attitudes to risk that is supported by the evidence.32
Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) show that there is ￿no risk aversion over and above
loss aversion￿ . In other words, it is quite possible that what empirical researchers are
picking out as risk aversion is really caused by loss aversion instead.33 Therefore, it is
worth analyzing the e⁄ect of loss aversion on crime in the model that we set out above.
The individuals in our model make one of two possible decisions: To engage in the legal
activity or the illegal activity. From Proposition 10, under the conditions of the Becker
proposition (p ! 0;F ! 1), and Assumptions A1-A4, all individuals decide to opt for
the legal activity. Hence, an increase in loss aversion by making the consequences of the
illegal activity even worse, has no impact on individual decisions. In other words, as is
typically the case in mechanism design problems, we get a corner solution that entirely
eliminates crime and so many of the comparative static e⁄ects are simply zero. Therefore,
in order to isolate the impact of loss aversion we make the following assumption.
5. Assumption A5 (Punishments bounded above): We assume that for whatever reasons,
say, those mentioned in subsection 1.1 in the introduction, Fmax < 1.34 Hence, some
individuals are not dissuaded from crime.
Let us then look at the impact of the loss aversion parameter, ￿, on the three kinds of
individuals when assumptions A1, A4, A5 hold (we do not require assumptions A2, A3 for
the results in this subsection).
1. Socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1): Rewrite the NCC (8.7) as
￿ ￿ ￿S, (6.12)
where










w(p) + w(1 ￿ p)
￿1=￿
. (6.14)
If g > 0 then all individuals with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ minf0;￿Sg will not commit the crime,
whereas all socially responsible individuals with ￿ > minf0;￿Sg will commit the
crime. It is straightforward to check that
@g
@￿ > 0. Hence, an increase in loss aversion,
32Under CP, the four-fold pattern is as follows; see Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Kahneman and
Tversky (2000, p. 56). In the domain of gains, individuals are risk loving for small probabilities and risk
averse for larger probabilities. In the domain of losses individuals are risk loving for large probabilities
and risk averse for small probabilities.
33See also, for instance, Kahneman and Tversky (2000), Kahneman (2003), Marquis and Homer (1996)
and Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2004).
34Thus, the Becker prescription (p ! 0;F ! 1) does not hold.
21by increasing ￿S, reduces the extent of crime in society. The intuition is that an
increase in loss aversion makes the existing level of punishment even more onerous,
hence, reducing the incentive to engage in the illegal activity. If g < 0 then all
socially responsible people commit the crime anyway and an increase in ￿ has no
e⁄ect on the extent of crime for such people.
2. Regretful individuals (1 < ￿ ￿ ￿): Rewrite the NCC (8.9) as
￿ ￿ ￿R, (6.15)
where














When h > 0, all regretful individuals for whom 1 < ￿ ￿ minf￿R;￿g will not commit
the crime while all those with ￿ > ￿R will commit the crime. It is simple to check
that @h
@￿ > 0. Hence, ￿R is increasing in ￿. Therefore, as in in the case of socially
responsible individuals, an increase in loss aversion, by increasing ￿R, reduces the
extent of crime. When h < 0, all regretful individuals will commit the crime and so
an increase in loss aversion will have no e⁄ect on the extent of crime.













Then all rational individuals will commit the crime if their loss aversion is low enough
in the sense that ￿ < ￿
￿ and not commit the crime otherwise.
7. Conclusions
The Becker proposition, summarized eloquently in Kolm￿ s (1973) phrase ￿hang o⁄enders
with probability zero￿ , is a cornerstone in the ￿ economics and law￿literature and has
provided the basis for much further development of the ￿eld.
A sizeable literature addresses the Becker paradox in an expected utility (EU) framework
and considers several worthwhile extensions. We argue that it is very di¢ cult to reconcile
EU with the evidence, a well known fact, but, to our mind, not given enough prominence
in the law and economics literature. Hence, we re-examine the Becker paradox from the
22perspective of alternative mainstream non-linear decision theories that ￿t the evidence
much better than EU. These theories are as tractable as EU and equally rigorous. Two
main alternatives that we consider are rank dependent expected utility (RDU), which,
Machina (2008) describes as the most popular alternative to the EU model and cumulative
prospect theory (CP), the Nobel prize winning work of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
The Becker proposition reemerges under RDU and CP.
When put under the lens of CP, in a standard model of crime, the Becker proposition is
robust to several plausible assumptions about the reference points of potential criminals.
We allow for heterogeneity among potential criminals in terms of their reference points,
which allows us to consider behavior that is consistent with rational expectations, regret
and social responsibility. In each case, so long as the decision maker is rational (as opposed
to being pathological) the Becker proposition holds under CP.
In addition to demonstrating that the Becker proposition holds under RDU and CP,
our paper serves two alternative purpose as well. First, we give a more satisfactory formal
account of BP. Second, we demonstrate how a standard model of crime can be analyzed
under these alternative decision theories. Our analysis gives readers a feel for the possible
problems that could be analyzed under alternative decision theories and demonstrates that
the analysis under these alternative theories is rigorous and tractable. This should give
further impetus to the emerging literature on Behavioral Law and Economics.
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8. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For the proofs of (a) and (b) see al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011,
Proposition 1), (c) then follows using the identity
d
dp
[TF (p;F)]F=’(p) = [TFF (p;F)’
0 (p) + TpF (p;F)]F=’(p) = 0.
Finally, (d) is an immediate consequence of (c). ￿
Proof of Lemma 1:
d
dp












































F at F = ’(p). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: Immediate from the NCC (3.1). ￿
23Proof of Proposition 3: (a) The NCC (3.1) is clearly satis￿ed for p = 1 and F ￿
b = y1 ￿ y0. Let F = ’(p) be a di⁄erentiable punishment function. The NCC in (3.1)
continues to hold, as p declines from 1, if, and only if
d
dp




0 (y1 ￿ ’(p)) ￿ u(y1) ￿ u(y1 ￿ ’(p)). (8.2)
For the HPF (2.6), ￿p’0 (p) = ’(p), so the NCC, (8.2), becomes
NCC for HPF: u
0 (y1 ￿ ’(p)) ￿
u(y1) ￿ u(y1 ￿ ’(p))
’(p)
. (8.3)
Since the decision maker is risk averse or risk neutral, u is concave. It then follows that
the NCC (8.3) will hold for all p 2 (0;1]. This proves (a).
(b) Since ’(p) = b





dp = 1. By assumption
￿C
p > ￿C
F, thus, it follows, from Lemma 1, that d
dpC (p;’(p)) > 0. Since crime is deterred,
D(p;’(p)) = 0 (see subsection 2.1 for this assumption). Hence, T (p;’(p)) = C (p;’(p))
which implies that d
dpT (p;’(p)) > 0. Since the objective is to minimize T (p;’(p)), this
establishes part (b). ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: We omit the simple proof of part (a).











p!0(￿lnp) = 1. Since 0 < ￿ < 1, we get lim
p!0(￿lnp)








p!0e￿￿ lnp = lim
p!0p￿￿ = 1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6: Immediate from the NCC (5.4). ￿
Proof of Proposition 7: Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, except for the following
points: (a) ’(p) = b
1￿w(1￿p) (instead of ’(p) = b





p = 1). ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: Di⁄erentiating (5.6) partially with respect to p gives ￿p(p;F) =
￿w0 (1 ￿ p)[u(y1) ￿ u(y1 ￿ F)] < 0 for all F and p. Di⁄erentiating with respect to F
gives ￿F(p;F) = ￿[1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u0 (y1 ￿ F) ￿ 0, for all F and p, with ￿F(p;F) < 0 for
p > 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8: We make essential use of Lemma 2.
We ￿rst prove (a). Let F > b. At p = 0, ￿(0;F) = u(y1) > u(y0) so the individual
commits the crime. At p = 1, ￿(1;F) = u(y1 ￿ F) < u(y0) so the individual does not
24commit the crime. Since ￿(p;F) is continuous, there exists some pc at which ￿(pc;F) =
u(y0). Since ￿p < 0, for all p ￿ pc, ￿(pc;F) ￿ u(y0) and so individuals do not commit
the crime. For all p < pc, ￿(pc;F) > u(y0) and so individuals commit the crime.
Part (b) can be proved in an analogous manner. Let p > 0. At F = 0, ￿(p;0) = u(y1) >
u(y0), hence, all individuals commit the crime. Because u(y1 ￿ F) ! ￿1 < u(y0), as
F ! 1, no individual commits the crime for su¢ ciently large F. Since (1) ￿ is continuous,
(2) ￿(p;0) > u(y0), and (3) ￿(p;F) < u(y0) for su¢ ciently large F, there exists some
critical value Fc at which ￿(p;Fc) = u(y0). Since ￿F < 0 for F ￿ Fc, ￿(p;Fc) ￿ u(y0) and
so individuals do not commit the crime. For F < Fc, ￿(p;Fc) > u(y0) and so individuals
commit the crime. ￿
Proof of Proposition 9: Immediate from the NCC (6.6). ￿
Proof of Proposition 10: We have computed income relative to the reference point for
the legal activity in (6.11). For our model of crime, using (6.10) and Assumption 1, we
now compute the income relative to the reference point in each state from the criminal
activity. ￿
y1 ￿ ’(p) ￿ yc = b ￿ ’(p) = ￿b
1￿p
p , if caught,
y1 ￿ yc = b, if not caught.
(8.4)
From (8.4), if the criminal is not caught then income relative to the reference point is the
bene￿t, b, from the crime. If caught, this bene￿t is reduced by the amount of the ￿ne,







+ w(1 ￿ p)v(b) ￿ v (y0 (1 ￿ ￿)). (8.5)
We now use (8.5) to analyze the three cases, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1, 1 < ￿ ￿ ￿, and ￿ = 1.
1. Socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1): In this case, y0 (1 ￿ ￿) > 0. Hence,




p￿ + w(1 ￿ p)b
￿ ￿ y
￿
0 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ , (8.6)












To see if the Becker proposition holds, we take limits on both sides as p ! 0 (for
the HPF this automatically implies F = 1 as required by the Becker proposition).
From Assumption A3, lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1. From the de￿nition of a probability weighting


















Hence, as p ! 0, the inequality in (8.7) becomes






which is true. Hence, the Becker proposition holds for socially responsible individu-
als.
2. Regretful individuals (1 < ￿ ￿ ￿): In this case, y0(1 ￿ ￿) < 0. Analogous to (8.7),












Taking the limits as p ! 0 in (8.9) we get that






which is true. Hence, the Becker proposition also holds for regretful individuals.
3. Individuals with rational expectations (￿ = 1). In this case y0(1￿￿) = 0. Recalling
that v(0) = 0 (see De￿nition 11), the analogue of the NCC in (8.8), (8.10) is
￿1 + 1 < 0,
which is true. Hence, the Becker proposition also holds for individuals with rational
expectations. ￿
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Abstract
In a seminal paper, Becker (1968) showed that the most e¢ cient way to deter
crime is to impose the severest possible penalty (to maintain adequate deterrence)
with the lowest possible probability (to economize on costs of enforcement). We shall
call this the Becker proposition (BP). The BP is derived under the assumptions of
expected utility theory (EU). However, EU is heavily rejected by the evidence. A
range of non-expected utility theories have been proposed to explain the evidence.
The two leading alternatives to EU are rank dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative
prospect theory (CP). The main contributions of this paper are: (1) We formalize
the BP in a more satisfactory manner. (2) We show that the BP holds under RDU
and CP. (3) We give a formal behavioral approach to crime and punishment that
could have applicability to a wide range of problems in the economics of crime.
Keywords: Crime and punishment, non-linear weighting of probabilities, cumu-
lative prospect theory, rank dependent utility, probability weighting functions, pun-
ishment functions.
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+44-116-2522898. Fax: +44-116-2522908. E-mail: aa10@le.ac.uk."If the supply of o⁄enses depended only on pf￿ o⁄enders were risk neutral ￿ a re-
duction in p...would lower the loss...The loss would be minimized, therefore, by lowering p
arbitrarily close to zero and raising f su¢ ciently high so that the produce pf would induce
the optimal number of o⁄enses." Becker (1968, p. 183).
1. Introduction
In a seminal contribution, Becker (1968) opened the way to a rigorous formal economic
analysis of crime. Becker (1968) showed that the most e¢ cient way to deter a crime
is to impose the severest possible penalty with the lowest possible probability. We shall
call this the Becker proposition. The intuition is simple and compelling. By reducing the
probability of detection and conviction, society can economize on costs of enforcement such
as policing and trial costs. But by increasing the severity of the punishment (monetary
and non-monetary), the deterrence e⁄ect of the punishment is maintained.
The Becker proposition takes a particularly stark form if the decision maker follows
expected utility theory (EU) and if we add two assumptions: (1) Risk neutrality or risk aver-
sion. (2) The availability of in￿nitely severe (monetary and non-monetary) punishments,
e.g., capital punishment. With these extra assumptions, the Becker proposition implies
that crime would be deterred completely, however small the probability of detection and
conviction, as illustrated in Becker￿ s quote at the beginning.1 Kolm (1973) memorably
phrased this as hang o⁄enders with probability zero.
The Becker proposition (BP) has had a tremendous impact on the economics and law
literature and it introduced a formal economic approach to crime.2 The BP has spawned
a great deal of literature that typically relaxes some assumption behind the BP or embeds
the BP within a more complex setting in order to see if the BP holds.
1.1. How robust is the BP?
The BP might not hold for a variety of reasons. For instance, criminals could be risk-
seeking (Becker, 1968). In￿nite ￿nes could be di¢ cult to collect due to bankruptcy con-
straints (Friedman, 1999; Polinsky and Shavell, 1991). Because of the danger of falsely
convicting an innocent person (a Type-I error), society could face huge welfare losses from
large ￿nes (Andreoni, 1991; Feess and Wholschlegel, 2009; Polinsky and Shavell, 2000b).
High ￿nes might encourage rent-seeking behavior on the part of law-enforcers to collude
in acquitting criminals (Friedman, 1999). For reasons of norms and fairness society may
1In the quote, p is the probability of detection and conviction and f is the punishment (monetary and
non-monetary).
2The salience of the Becker proposition in that literature can be gauged from the fact that a Google
Scholar search shows that it has been cited 7050 times
2not accept the severe punishments required by the BP (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000a). Risk
averse criminals whose utility enters the social welfare function would be severely hit by
very high ￿nes in the event that they are caught, lowering social welfare (Polinsky and
Shavell,1979; Kaplow, 1992). Pathological criminals are not deterred by high ￿nes anyway
(Colman, 1995).
The extensions of the Becker proposition noted above have enriched the literature
and deepened our understanding of the economics of crime. Like Becker (1968), these
extensions use expected utility theory (EU), a decision theory whose predictions, as we
discuss below, are routinely refuted by the evidence .
Our ￿rst objective is to formalize the BP. Our second objective is to check for the
robustness of BP with respect to alternative decision theories that are better supported
by the evidence as compared to EU. The third objective of our paper is to outline a
formal behavioral approach to crime and punishment that can potentially have a range of
applications to related problems.
1.2. Expected utility theory, its refutations and the leading alternatives
A common feature of all the robustness tests of the BP brie￿ y outlined in subsection
1.1 above, is that they assume criminals follow expected utility theory (EU). Despite its
overwhelming popularity in the literature, EU has been strongly rejected by the evidence
gathered over several decades of research. The Allais paradox, in its common ratio and
common consequence forms, was an early demonstration of the violation of the indepen-
dence axiom of EU. Other well documented violations have included preference reversals,
violation of framing invariance, violation of the reduction of compound lotteries axiom,
violation of the dependence of utility on ￿nal wealth rather than wealth relative to a refer-
ence point (reference dependence), con￿ ation of risk aversion with loss aversion, attitudes
to risk that depend only on the shape of the utility function, unreasonable risk aversion
for large stake gambles if there is risk aversion over small stakes, qualitatively and quanti-
tatively incorrect results when pitted in a race with other decision theories, among many
others.3
EU has two salient features. (1) The objective function is linear in probabilities, and
(2) utility is de￿ned over ￿nal levels of wealth. For a range of problems, such as the Allais
paradox, it was found that the relaxation of linearity in probabilities provided a solution.
This lead to the development of several alternatives. According to Machina (2008) the
most popular of these alternatives is rank dependent utility (RDU), developed by Quiggin
(1982). However, RDU retains the second salient feature of EU, namely that utilities are
3The literature documenting violations of EU has assumed huge proportions. Comprehensive reviews of
the violation of EU can be found in Kahneman and Tversky (2000), Starmer (2000), Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007, 2010b), Wakker (2010), Crawford and Meng (2011).
3de￿ned over ￿nal wealth levels. RDU can explain everything that EU can explain because
EU is a special case of RDU. But, in addition, RDU can explain a range of phenomena
that EU is unable to explain.
Empirical evidence arising from several economic phenomena demonstrates strongly,
and robustly, the following facts; see Kahneman and Tversky (1979, 2000), Starmer (2000)
and Wakker (2010). Individuals derive utility not from ￿nal wealth levels but changes in
wealth relative to a reference level (reference dependence).4 This partitions the domain of
outcomes into gains (when wealth exceeds the reference point) and the domain of losses
(when wealth is lower than the reference wealth). Individuals exhibit loss aversion, namely
the tendency for losses to bite more than equivalent gains. Furthermore, the utility func-
tion is concave in the domain of gains and convex in the domain of losses (diminishing
sensitivity). We discuss these features in detail in section 6.
The award of the Nobel Prize to Daniel Kahneman was in recognition for joint work,
largely with Amos Tversky.5 They documented severe violations of EU and provided in
its place a successful alternative in the form of prospect theory (PT) also known as ￿rst
generation prospect theory. PT is described in Kahneman and Tversky (1979), which is
the second most cited paper in economics since 1970 (see Dellavigna, 2009). In PT, both
salient features of EU, namely, linearity in probabilities and utility de￿ned over ￿nal wealth,
are relaxed. In particular, the second of these two salient features is relaxed by allowing
for reference dependence, loss aversion and declining sensitivity. All these features of PT
are based on strong experimental evidence. This work was followed by second generation
prospect theory, also known as cumulative prospect theory (CP) in Tversky and Kahneman
(1992), who incorporated insights from Quiggin￿ s work on RDU into PT (see section 6
below). In conjunction, PT and CP are able to address most of the shortcomings of EU
brie￿ y mentioned in the opening paragraph of this subsection.
Many economic phenomena require reference dependence, loss aversion and declining
sensitivity as essential components. As one might expect, EU and RDU typically do
not perform well in the domain of these economic phenomena while PT and CP do far
better. The range of such phenomena is very wide and important. In the context of
criminal activity, speci￿cally tax evasion, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) show that the
predictions of EU are both quantitatively incorrect (by up to 100 fold) and qualitatively
incorrect.6 This raises great di¢ culty in applying EU to empirical or theoretical work in
4In a classic experiment from psychology an individual is asked to dip one hand (hand L) in hot water
and another hand (hand R) in cold water. Once the hands become attuned to the respective temperatures,
both hands are taken out simultaneously and dipped in lukewarm water. Hand L reports the lukewarm
water to be cold while hand R reports the lukewarm water to be hot.
5Daniel Kahneman won the 2002 Nobel prize in Economics. Sadly, Amos Tversky died in 1996 and
there is no provision to receive the Nobel prize postumously.
6The qualitative incorrectness in this case refers to the Yitzhaki puzzle. Under plausible attitudes to
4economics. By contrast, the evidence is easily explained by CP. Camerer (2000) documents
the superior performance of PT/CP for a range of phenomena that include the disposition
e⁄ect, asymmetric price elasticities, the excess sensitivity of consumption to income, the
equity premium puzzle, elasticities of labour supply and asset pricing, among others.7
CP can explain everything that EU and RDU can, but the converse is false, hence, CP
is the most satisfactory decision theory among the leading alternatives. Indeed, EU and
RDU are special cases of CP. Furthermore, CP is very tractable in actual applications. The
continued use of EU in the face of ever mounting refutations, better developed, equally
tractable and equally rigorous alternative theories that conform much better with the
evidence is one of the great puzzles in the economics profession. We do not assume a
knowledge of RDU and CP on the part of the reader in this paper. The relevant concepts
are developed during the paper when needed.
1.3. Research problems, results and some implications
The BP has been extended in several directions (see subsection 1.1 above), yet the analysis
has steadfastly continued to assume EU in most cases despite EU having faced intense
refutations for several decades. We ￿nd this puzzling and surprising.8 A major research
aim of our paper is to test if the BP holds under RDU and CP. We ￿nd that the BP is
robust to a consideration of alternative mainstream decision theories. In particular, we
￿nd that the BP holds for RDU as well as for CP. We also provide a clearer derivation of
the BP under EU. A related contribution of our paper is that by addressing a basic crime
and punishment problem in a non-expected utility framework, it opens up the way for a
consideration of other problems and issues using our framework.
Our ￿ndings have mixed implication for alternative explanations of the violations of
the BP outlined brie￿ y in subsection 1.1 above. On the one hand, our ￿ndings strengthen
these alternative explanations because if the BP is violated, it is not on account of a refuted
theory, namely, EU. We show that the BP continues to hold under RDU and CP, theories
which are con￿rmed much better by the evidence. In this sense, the research program
for alternative explanations was fortuitously headed in the right direction. On the other
hand, because the alternative explanations themselves continued to use EU, it might be
risk, EU predicts that when the tax rate increases, taxpayers will evade less. In the limit when the tax
rate is a 100%, all income is declared. This contradicts the bulk of evidence; see Dhami and al-Nowaihi
(2007) for the details.
7The interested reader can also consult Kahneman and Tversky (2000), the Nobel lecture by Kahneman
(2003) and a review of ￿eld studies in Dellavigna (2009).
8Neilson and Winter (1997) make an attempt to apply RDU to a problem of crime but their intention
was not to see if BP holds under RDU. They were interested in showing that even if individuals violate
EU they could still be risk averse. A much more complete treatment of attitudes to risk under RDU,
arising as the product of the shapes of the utility function and the probability weighting function can be
found in Wakker (2010).
5worthwhile to re-examine them in the light of RDU and CP to check if they continue to
hold. The latter remark is not purely speculative. In the context of the criminal activity
of tax evasion, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007, 2010), show that EU gives results that are
qualitatively incorrect and quantitatively incorrect.
1.4. Organization of the paper
Section 2 formulates a standard economic model of crime. The Becker proposition is
considered under EU in Section 3. Section 4 gives a brief discussion of probability weighting
functions, with particular emphasis on the Prelec (1998) function. Section 5 shows that
the Becker proposition holds under RDU and Section 6 shows it also holds under CP. We
consider ￿xed reference points in subsection 6.2, while subsection 6.3 allows for a wider
range of reference points as well as heterogeneity among criminals. Section 7 concludes.
All proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The model and assumptions
Suppose that an individual receives income, y0, from being engaged in some legal activity
and income, y1, y1 > y0, from being engaged in some illegal activity. Hence, the bene￿t,
b, to the perpetrator from the illegal activity is
b = y1 ￿ y0 > 0. (2.1)
If engaged in the illegal activity, the individual is caught with some probability p, 0 ￿
p ￿ 1. If caught, the individual is asked to pay a ￿ne, F. As in much of the existing
literature, particularly Becker (1968), we use the simplifying assumption that F is the
monetary equivalent of all punishments.9 We assume that,
F 2 [0;1]. (2.2)
In particular, it is feasible to levy a ￿ne at least equal to the bene￿t from crime, b. This
is true of Examples 1 - 3 that we give below, consistent with real world practice and is an
assumption that is made in standard models of crime and punishment; see, for instance,
Polinsky and Shavell (2007). Given the enforcement parameters p, F, the individual makes
only one choice, to commit the crime or not.
This framework nests several important settings. Consider the following examples.
9Thus, we are assuming that it is possible to impute a monetary value to all possible kinds of punish-
ments such as incarceration, loss of reputation, naming and shaming etc. While this is not innocuous, it
simpli￿es the analysis substantially.
6Example 1 (Theft/robbery): Engaging in theft gives a monetary reward b ￿ 0. If the
thief is caught (with probability p ￿ 0) the goods, whose value is b, are impounded and,
in addition, the o⁄ender pays a ￿ne, f ￿ 0 (or faces other penalties such as imprisonment
whose equivalent monetary value is f). Hence, F = b + f.
Example 2 (Tax evasion): Consider the following widely used model (Allingham and
Sandmo, 1972). A taxpayer has taxable incomes z1 > 0 and z2 > 0 from two economic
activities, both of which are taxed at the rate t > 0. Income z1 cannot be evaded (for
instance, it could be wage income with the tax withheld at source). However, the individual
can choose to evade or declare income z2.10 It follows that y0 = (1 ￿ t)(z1 + z2). Suppose
that the taxpayer chooses to evade income z2. Hence, y1 = (1 ￿ t)z1 + z2 > y0 and the
bene￿t from tax evasion is b = tz2 ￿ 0. If caught evading, the individual is asked to pay
back the tax liabilities owed, b = tz2, and an additional ￿ne f = ￿tz2 where ￿ > 0 is the
penalty rate. Hence, F = (1 + ￿)tz2.
Example 3 (Pollution): Consider a ￿rm that produces a ￿xed output that is sold for a
pro￿t, ￿. As a by-product, and conditional on the ￿rm￿ s existing technology, the ￿rm
creates a level of emissions, E, that is greater than the legal limit, E. With probability
p ￿ 0 the ￿rm￿ s emissions are audited by the appropriate regulatory authority. Emissions
can be reduced at a cost of c > 0 per unit by making changes to existing technology.








￿ 0 is the bene￿t arising










We have not speci￿ed the preferences of the individual, yet. In subsequent sections we
shall consider, sequentially, the possibilities that the decision maker has expected utility
(EU), rank dependent utility (RDU), and cumulative prospect theory (CP) preferences.
2.1. The social costs of crime and law enforcement
Let C (p;F) ￿ 0 be the cost to society of law enforcement. Let D(p;F) be the damage
to society caused by crime. We assume that C (0;0) = 0, i.e., in the absence of any law
enforcement, costs of such enforcement are zero. If crime is deterred completely by p = p0
and F = F0 then, we assume, D(p0;F0) = 0.
We also assume that C and D are continuous functions of p and F with continuous
￿rst and second partial derivatives11, i.e., C;D 2 C2. We denote partial derivatives with
10Examples include income from several kinds of ￿nancial assets, domestic work, private tuition, private
rent, income from overseas, among many others. In actual practice, tax evasion often takes the form of
completely hiding certain taxable activities; see Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007).
11Cn is the class of continuous functions with continuous partial derivatives up to order n.
7subscripts, e.g., Cp = @C
@p and CpF = @2C
@p@F . We assume that
Cp > 0, CF ￿ 0. (2.3)
Thus, the cost of law enforcement can be reduced by reducing the probability of de-
tection and conviction, p. In general, an increase in the punishment, F, will increase the
cost of law enforcement (for example, increasing the length of prison sentences). We note,
for future reference, a special case below.
De￿nition 1 (Ideal ￿ne): The case CF = 0 can be thought of as that of an ideal ￿ne,
which has a ￿xed administrative cost and involves a transfer from the o⁄ender to the victim
or society (so there is no aggregate loss to society other than the ￿xed administrative cost).
2.2. Society￿ s objective
Let
T (p;F) = C (p;F) + D(p;F), (2.4)
be the total cost to society of crime. We assume that
[TF]F=0 < 0. (2.5)
Society aims to choose the instruments p and F so as to minimize T (p;F). The
condition in (2.5) ensures that total costs can be reduced by raising the ￿ne just above
zero, hence, F = 0 is not optimal.
2.3. A principal-agent interpretation of the model
We can also interpret this model more generally as that of a principal-agent relationship.
A principal contracts an agent to perform a certain task in exchange for the monetary
reward y0. The agent can either carry out his task honestly or can improperly exploit
the principal￿ s facilities to enhance his income to y1 > y0. This causes damage, D, to the
principal. The principal can introduce a monitoring technology and a system of sanctions
at a cost C (p;F). The total cost to the principal is, thus, T (p;F) = C (p;F) + D(p;F),
where p is the probability of detection and F is the sanction. The analogue of Becker￿ s
proposition, in this case, is to impose the severest sanction on the agent with the minimum
probability of detection, i.e., o⁄er, what Rasmusen (1994) calls, a boiling in oil contract.
2.4. Punishment functions
The objective of minimizing T (p;F) with respect to p;F can be broken down into two
stages. First, we ask whether, for each p, there is a level of punishment, F = ’(p), that
8minimizes T (p;’(p)) given p. If the existence of such an optimal punishment function is
assured, then we can ask whether there exists a probability, p, that minimizes T (p;’(p)).
Formal de￿nitions are given below. First, we de￿ne a punishment function (optimal or
otherwise), then we de￿ne an optimal punishment function.
De￿nition 2 (Punishment function): By a punishment function we mean a function
’(p) : [0;1] ! [0;1] that assigns to each probability of detection and conviction, p 2 [0;1],
a punishment ’(p) 2 [0;1].
Note that we allow for the possibility of in￿nite punishments, i.e., we allow for the
possibility that ’(p) = 1 for some p.
De￿nition 3 (Optimal punishment function): Let ’ : [0;1] ! [0;1] be a punishment
function. We call ’ an optimal punishment function if, for all p 2 [0;1] such that ’(p) < 1,
and for all F 2 [0;1), T (p;’(p)) ￿ T (p;F).
Proposition 1 (Existence of optimal punishment functions):
(a) An optimal punishment function, ’(p) : [0;1] ! [0;1], exists.
(b) If ’(p) < 1 then [TF (p;F)]F=’(p) = 0 and [TFF (p;F)]F=’(p) ￿ 0.







(d) If ’(p) < 1, [TFF (p;F)]F=’(p) > 0 and [TpF (p;F)]F=’(p) > 0 then ’0 (p) < 0.
De￿nition 4 (Cost and ￿ne elasticities): ￿C
p =
p
CCp is the probability elasticity of cost,
￿C
F = F





dp is the probability
elasticity of punishment.
Lemma 1 : d
dpC (p;’(p)) > 0 if, and only if, ￿C
p > ￿F
p ￿C




F is most likely to hold when the costs to society do not
increase too rapidly in response to an increase in ￿nes. It will be satis￿ed for an ideal ￿ne,
since ￿C
p > 0 and ￿C
F = 0 for an ideal ￿ne (see De￿nition 1).
2.5. The hyperbolic punishment function
A popular and tractable subset of ’(p) is the hyperbolic punishment function (HPF),
H(p).
De￿nition 5 : A hyperbolic punishment function, HPF is de￿ned by
H(p) = c=p. (2.6)
where c is a positive constant.
9The name derives from the fact that in p;F space, the HPF plots as a rectangular
hyperbola. Note that, for (2.6), ’(0) = 1. The justi￿cation for the hyperbolic punishment
function is considered in al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011a). The HPF has been widely used
in the law and economics ￿eld.12
3. The Becker proposition under expected utility theory (EU)
We now consider the Becker proposition (BP) under EU. One of the objectives of this
section is to give a more satisfactory formal treatment of the BP.13 Consider an individual
with continuously di⁄erentiable and strictly increasing utility of income, u.
If he does not engage in crime, his income is y0. In that case, his payo⁄from no-crime,
UNC, is given by UNC = u(y0). On the other hand, if the individual engages in crime, his
income is y1 if not caught, but y1 ￿F ￿ y1, if caught. Since he is caught with probability,
p, his expected utility from crime, EUC, is given by EUC = pu(y1 ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)u(y1).
The individual does not engage in crime if the no-crime condition (NCC) EUC ￿ UNC is
satis￿ed. Thus, the no-crime condition is
NCC: pu(y1 ￿ F) + (1 ￿ p)u(y1) ￿ u(y0). (3.1)
Proposition 2 (Becker, 1968): Under EU, if the utility function is unbounded below, so
that u(y1 ￿ F) ! ￿1 as F ! 1, then, for any probability of punishment p > 0, no
matter how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently severe punishment, F.
We show in Proposition 3 below that (i) not only does the Becker proposition hold for
risk-neutral and risk averse criminals, (ii) its implementation is socially desirable because
it reduces the total cost of crime, T (p;F), for society.
Proposition 3 (Becker, 1968)14: Under EU,
(a) If the individual is risk neutral or risk averse, so that u is concave, then the HPF
’(p) = b
p will deter crime. It follows that given any probability of detection and conviction,
p > 0, no matter how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently large punishment.
(b) If, in addition, ￿C
p > ￿C
F (De￿nition 4), then reducing p reduces the total social cost of
crime and law enforcement, T (p;F).
12The following quote from Polinsky and Shavell (2007, footnote 16) testi￿es to the importance of the
HPF: ￿[The HPF] or its equivalent, was put forward by Bentham (1789, p.173), was emphasized by Becker
(1968), and has been noted by many others since then.￿
13In Becker (1968) the ￿rst order conditions are given with equality. When the optimum lies on the
boundary this poses obvious problems. An intuitive argument is then given in Becker (1968) to justify a
boundary solution. We provide the formal underpinning to Becker￿ s informal argument.
14While Proposition 3(a) is well known from Becker (1968), Proposition 3(b) is, as far as we know, a
new result.
10Example 4 : Consider the utility function u(y) = ￿e￿y. Note that u0 (y) = e￿y > 0;
u00 (y) = ￿e￿y < 0. From the second inequality, we see that this utility function exhibits
risk averse behavior. Hence, from Proposition 3 (a) it would be possible to deter crime,
however small the probability of detection and conviction.
In contrast to these results, Levitt (2004) argues ￿... given the rarity with which
executions are carried out in this country and the long delays in doing so, a rational
criminal should not be deterred by the threat of execution.￿That might well be true as
an empirical ￿nding. However, this empirical observation is certainly not consistent with
the decision maker following EU, under the conditions of Proposition 3. The probability
of capital punishment can be made arbitrarily small but it will certainly deter crime under
EU (Becker proposition).
4. Probability weighting functions (PWF)
All mainstream decision theory models that relax the ￿linearity in probabilities￿assump-
tion of EU, e.g., rank dependent utility (RDU) and cumulative prospect theory (CP),
have one thing in common. Namely, that the decision maker uses a probability weighting
function (PWF), denoted by w(p), that transforms probabilities, p.
De￿nition 6 : A probability weighting function (PWF) is a strictly increasing function
w : [0;1]
onto ￿! [0;1].
A simple proof, that we omit, can be used to derive the following Proposition.
Proposition 4 : A PWF, w(p), has the following properties: (a) w(0) = 0, w(1) = 1.
(b) w has a unique inverse, w￿1, and w￿1 is also a strictly increasing function from [0;1]
onto [0;1]. (c) w and w￿1 are continuous.
Since the Becker proposition hinges critically on the behavior of decision makers as
p ! 0, we now o⁄er some de￿nitions that establish the relevant terminology.




1. This is the sense in which a PWF is extremely steep as p ! 0.
De￿nition 8 (Standard probability weighting functions): We shall call the entire class of
probability weighting functions that satisfy De￿nition 7, for empirically relevant values of
￿, the class of standard probability weighting functions.
Some well known examples of standard probability weighting functions are Tversky
and Kahneman (1992), Gonzalez and Wu (1999), Lattimore, Baker and Witte (1992) and
Prelec (1998).
11Example 5 (Prelec￿ s probability weighting function): The Prelec (1998) probability weight-
ing function, w : [0;1]
onto ￿! [0;1], is one of the most popular and satisfactory probability
weighting functions. It is parsimonious, consistent with the stylized facts and has an
axiomatic foundation.15 It is given by w(0) = 0 and
w(p) = e
￿￿(￿lnp)￿
, 0 < p ￿ 1, 0 < ￿ < 1, ￿ > 0. (4.1)
The Prelec function is strictly concave for low probabilities but strictly convex for high
probabilities, i.e., it is inverse-S shaped as in w(p) = e￿(￿lnp)
1
2(￿ = 0:5, ￿ = 1), sketched
in Figure 4.1 as the bold curve. In Figure 4.1, the point of in￿ ection is on the 45o line.
This arises because ￿ = 1.16 Furthermore, it can be easily shown that in the special case
￿ = ￿ = 1; we get w(p) = p, as under expected utility theory.














Figure 4.1: The Prelec function w(p) = e￿(￿lnp)
1
2.
Proposition 5 : (a) The Prelec function (Example 5) is a probability weighting function
in the sense of De￿nition 6.
(b) For all ￿ > 0, the Prelec function (Example 5) in￿nitely overweights in￿nitesimal
probabilities (De￿nition 7), i.e., lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1. Thus, the Prelec function is a standard
probability weighting function (De￿nition 8).
15For the axiomatic foundations, see Prelec (1998) and al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2006).
16For ￿ < 1 the in￿ ection point is above the 45o line while for ￿ > 1 the in￿ ection point is below the
45o line. The interested reader can consult al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011b) for further details on these and
other related issues on the Prelec function.
12The bulk of the empirical evidence points to individuals having an inverse-S shaped
weighting function (as in the bold curve in Figure 4.1). Extensive empirical evidence for
this stylized fact is described in Wakker (2010). From Proposition 5, and as illustrated
in Figure 4.1, the Prelec function is consistent with this stylized fact.17 According to
Prelec (1998, p.505), the in￿nite limit in De￿nition 7, and Proposition 5(b), captures the
qualitative change as we move from improbability to impossibility.
5. The Becker paradox under rank dependent expected utility
Expected utility has two main features. It is (i) linear in probabilities, and (ii) utility is
de￿ned over ￿nal wealth levels. The refutations of EU have lead to the relaxation of both
these features. The most common relaxation has been to relax linearity in probabilities.
This was motivated initially by the inability of EU to explain various versions of the Allais
paradox arising from a violation of the independence axiom. The main alternative to EU
in decision theory that arose from work in this direction is rank dependent expected utility
(RDU). Machina (2008) describes RDU as the most popular alternative to EU.
The objective function under RDU is described in De￿nition 9, below. We follow it up
with an explanation.
De￿nition 9 (Quiggin 1982) Consider the lottery (x1;p1;x1;p1;:::;xn;pn) that pays some
monetary amount, xi, with probability, pi, where x1 ￿ x2 ￿ ::: ￿ xn. For RDU, the














where w is a standard probability weighting function (see De￿nition 8). The decision
maker￿ s rank dependent utility, RDU, is
RDU (x1;p1;x1;p1;:::;xn;pn) = ￿
n
j=1￿ju(xj). (5.2)
RDU o⁄ers a huge improvement over EU in terms of predictive success. The main dif-
ference between (5.2) and expected utility is that RDU replaces probabilities with decision
weights. With this modi￿cation to EU, RDU can explain everything that EU can, but the
converse is false (e.g., RDU can explain the Allais paradox while EU cannot).18 The con-
struction of decision weights in (5.1) shows the sense in which cumulative transformations
17The interested reader can consult al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011b) for more details.
18More formally, to see that EU is a special case of RDU, take the probability weighting function to
be w(p) = p. Then, from (5.1), we get ￿i = pi. From (5.2) we then get RDU (x1;p1;x1;p1;:::;xn;pn) =
￿n
j=1pju(xj), which is the EU objective function.
13of probabilities are made under RDU. This ensures that stochastically dominated choices
are never made by the decision maker; see Quiggin (1982).19
The decision weights in (5.1) may look complicated but they are actually very intuitive.
It can be shown that if, for instance, the probability weighting function is convex (concave)
throughout then a decision maker who uses (5.1) places much greater (smaller) decision
weight on smaller outcomes as compared to larger outcomes. Such a decision maker appears
to an outside observer as pessimistic (optimistic).20 Thus, while (5.1) may appear to be
cognitively challenging, it encapsulates simple psychological principles.
Almost all versions of RDU use standard probability weighting functions (De￿nition 8
and Proposition 5b).
Consider the model of crime in Section 2 and assume that the decision maker uses RDU.
Using De￿nition 9, the payo⁄from no-crime, the non-risky activity, is UNC = u(y0), while
that from crime is
EUC = [1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u(y1 ￿ F) + w(1 ￿ p)u(y1). (5.3)
Hence, the no-crime condition (NCC), RDUC ￿ UNC, holds if, and only if,
[1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u(y1 ￿ F) + w(1 ￿ p)u(y1) ￿ u(y0). (5.4)
Proposition 6 : (a) Under RDU, if the utility function is unbounded below, so that
u(y1 ￿ F) ! ￿1 as F ! 1, then, for any probability of punishment, p > 0, no matter
how small, crime can be deterred by a su¢ ciently severe punishment, F. In other words,
the Becker proposition holds.
Proposition 7 : Under RDU and for any PWF, w(p):
(a) If the utility function, u, is concave, then, given any p > 0, no matter how small, crime
is deterred by choosing the punishment function ’(p) = b
1￿w(1￿p), and




F (De￿nition 4 and Lemma 1), then reducing p reduces
the total social cost of crime and law enforcement, T (p;F).
Lemma 2 : The NCC (5.4) can be rewritten as:
￿(p;F) ￿ u(y0), (5.5)
where
￿(p;F) = [1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u(y1 ￿ F) + w(1 ￿ p)u(y1). (5.6)
￿(p;F) is continuous in p and F for all p;F with partial derivatives ￿p(p;F) < 0, for all
F and p, and ￿F(p;F) ￿ 0, for all F and p, where the latter inequality is strict for p > 0.
19This solved an important problem with Kahneman and Tversky￿ s (1979) prospect theory. Indeed
it was the incorporation of this insight that was the major impetus to Tversky and Kahneman￿ s (1992)
second generation prospect theory, which is known as cumulative prospect theory (CP).
20See Wakker (2010) for the details.
14We now give some comparative static e⁄ects of the policy instruments, p;F, for the
case of RDU in the Proposition below.
Proposition 8 : Suppose that the utility function is unbounded below, so that u(y1 ￿ F) !
￿1 as F ! 1. Then:
(a) For every F > b, there exists some p = pc 2 (0;1) such that for all p ￿ pc decision
makers choose the legal activity and for all p < pc they choose the illegal activity.
(b) For p > 0, there exists some F = Fc such that for all F ￿ Fc decision makers choose
the legal activity and for all F < Fc they choose the illegal activity.
6. The Becker proposition under cumulative prospect theory (CP)
6.1. An introduction to CP
Recall from the introduction to section 5 that RDU relaxes the assumption of linearity
in probabilities. However, like EU, RDU continues to assume that decision makers derive
utility from ￿nal levels of wealth. By contrast, a range of empirical evidence that has a
rich history in psychology and has been robustly con￿rmed in thousands of experiments
shows that decision makers behave in the following manner.21 (i) They derive utility from
changes in wealth relative to some reference point and not ￿nal wealth levels (reference
dependence). This partitions the domain of outcomes into the domain of gains and the
domain of losses relative to the reference point. (ii) Losses bite more than equivalent gains
(loss aversion). (iii) The utility function is concave in the domain of gains but convex in
the domain of losses (declining sensitivity). Hence, in each domain there is diminished
sensitivity to a move away from the reference point.
We now outline cumulative prospect theory (CP), the second generation of prospect
theory due to Tversky and Kahneman (1992). CP is rigorous, has axiomatic foundations,
is consistent with much of the evidence and has better explanatory power relative to EU
and RDU.22 Consider a lottery of the form
L = (y￿m;p￿m;y￿m+1;p￿m+1;:::;y￿1;p￿1;y0;p0;y1;p1;:::;yn;pn),
where y￿m ￿ ::: ￿ y0 ￿ ::: ￿ yn are the outcomes, possibly wealth levels, and p￿m;:::;pn
are the corresponding probabilities, such that
Pn
i=￿m pi = 1 and pi ￿ 0. The reference
point for wealth is denoted by y0.23 Thus, we have m outcomes in the domain of losses
21See Kahneman and Tversky (1979), Starmer (2000), Wakker (2010), al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011b).
22Readers interested in the axiomatic developments can follow up the references in Wakker (2010). The
empirical success of CP is highlighted and described in several places; see for instance Kahneman and
Tvesky (2000), Starmer (2000) and Wakker (2010).
23y0 could be initial wealth, status-quo wealth, average wealth, desired wealth, rational expectations
of future wealth etc. depending on the context. See Kahneman and Tversky (2000), K￿szegi and Rabin
(2006), and Schmidt et al. (2008).
15and n outcomes in the domain of gains for a total of m + n + 1 outcomes.
In CP, decision makers derive utility from wealth relative to a reference point for wealth,
y0. In order to capture this fact, we de￿ne lotteries in incremental form (also sometimes
known as ￿prospects￿ ; hence, the name ￿prospect theory￿ ).
De￿nition 10 (Lotteries in incremental form or ￿ prospects￿ ) Let xi = yi￿y0;i = ￿m;:::;n
be the increment in wealth relative to y0 when the outcome is yi and x￿m ￿ ::: ￿ x0 =
0 ￿ ::: ￿ xn. Then, a lottery in incremental form (or a prospect) is:
L = (x￿m;p￿m;x￿m+1;p￿m+1;:::;x￿1;p￿1;x0;p0;x1;p1;:::;xn;pn). (6.1)
Denote by LP the set of all prospects of the form given in (6.1).
Remark 1 : An outcome is in the domain of gains if xi ￿ 0 and in the domain of losses
if xi ￿ 0. Thus, the reference outcome, x0 = 0 is in both domains.
De￿nition 11 (Tversky and Kahneman, 1979). A utility function, v(x), under CP is a
continuous, strictly increasing, mapping v : R ! R that satis￿es:
1. v (0) = 0 (reference dependence).
2. v (x) is concave for x ￿ 0 (declining sensitivity for gains).
3. v (x) is convex for x ￿ 0 (declining sensitivity for losses).24
4. ￿v (￿x) > v (x) for x > 0 (loss aversion, e.g., a loss of $1 is more painful than the gain
of $1 is pleasurable).
Tversky and Kahneman (1992) propose the following utility function which has di⁄erent
shapes in the domain of gains and loss.
v (x) =
￿
x￿ if x ￿ 0
￿￿(￿x)
￿ if x < 0 , (6.2)
where ￿;￿;￿ are constants. The coe¢ cients of the power function satisfy 0 < ￿ < 1,
0 < ￿ < 1. ￿ ￿ 1 is known as the coe¢ cient of loss aversion. The utility function in
(6.2) ￿ts well the data in Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
estimated that ￿ ’ ￿ ’ 0:88 and ￿ ’ 2:25. This utility function also has an axiomatic
foundation.25
24Concavity in the domain of gains and convexity in the domain of losses does not mean, however, that
the decision maker is risk averse in the domain of gains and risk seeking in the domain of losses. The
reason is that attitudes to risk are also in￿ uenced by the shape of the probability weighting function. See,
for instance, the four-fold classi￿cation of risk outlined in Kahneman and Tversky (2000). See Wakker
(2010) for a formal textbook treatment.
25Tversky and Kahneman (1992) assert (but do not prove) that the axiom of preference homogeneity
((x;p) ￿ y ) (kx;p) ￿ ky) generates the value function in (6.2). al-Nowaihi et al. (2008) give a formal
proof, as well as some other results (e.g. that ￿ is necessarily identical to ￿).
16We now show how the decision weights are constructed under CP. This is the analogue
of the construction of decision weights under RDU (see De￿nition 9). The main di⁄erence
from RDU, in this respect, is that under CP, one computes decision weights separately
in the domain of gains and losses. In principle, one could use a probability weighting
function, w+, for the domain of gains and a di⁄erent weighting function, w￿, for the
domain of losses. However, the empirical evidence indicates that these functions are very
similar so, as in Prelec (1998), we set w+ = w￿ = w.26
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, j = ￿m;:::;￿1.
As in RDU, w is a standard probability weighting function (see De￿nition 8).
De￿nition 13 (Value function): A decision maker using CP maximizes the following value
function de￿ned over LP,
V (L) = ￿
n
i=￿m￿iv (xi), L 2 LP. (6.3)
where the utility function, v, is de￿ned in De￿nition 11 and the decision weights are de￿ned
in De￿nition 12.
6.2. Fixed reference points and ￿xed punishment levels
Let the reference incomes for crime and no-crime, be respectively, yc and ync, assumed
to be ￿xed in this subsection.27 Then, using reference dependence, the payo⁄ from not
committing crime is
VNC = v (y0 ￿ ync). (6.4)
26Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui et al. (2005) ￿nd that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the
curvature of the weighting function for gains and losses. For the Prelec function (see Example 5), we
know that the parameter ￿ controls the curvature. However, the elevation (which in the Prelec function is
controlled by the parameter ￿) can be di⁄erent in the domain of gains and losses. Empirically, however,
it appears that ￿ = 1 or is very close to 1.
27In the original version of CP, in Tversky and Kahneman (1992), the reference point is ￿xed. In their
third generation prospect theory, denoted by PT3, Schmidt et al. (2008) suggest using state-dependent
reference points. However, the model by Schmidt et al. (2008) relies on reference dependent subjective
expected utility of Sugden (2003) and so PT3 is linear in probabilities (as is, of course, EU). Thus, PT3
cannot address the inverse S-shape of the probability weighting function. For that reason we do not follow
PT3, but we exploit it￿ s insight of using state dependent reference points in section 6.3.
17Recall that the outcomes under CP are split into the domain of gains and losses.28 We
make the plausible assumption that the decision maker who commits a crime is in the
domain of gains if not caught and in the domain of losses if caught. Thus, if caught (with
probability p), the outcome, y1 ￿ F, is in the domain of losses (i.e., y1 ￿ F ￿ yc ￿ 0).
If not caught (with probability 1 ￿ p), the outcome, y1, is in the domain of gains (i.e.,
y1 ￿ yc ￿ 0). Thus, we have one outcome each in the domain of losses and gains.29 Using
De￿nition 12, the respective decision weights are w(p) and w(1 ￿ p).30 Then, under CP,
the individual￿ s payo⁄ from committing a crime is given by
VC = w(p)v (y1 ￿ F ￿ yc) + w(1 ￿ p)v(y1 ￿ yc): (6.5)
The no crime condition (NCC) in the case of CP is VC ￿ VNC, which is equivalent to
w(p)v (y1 ￿ F ￿ yc) + w(1 ￿ p)v(y1 ￿ yc) ￿ v (y0 ￿ ync). (6.6)
From (6.6), ceteris-paribus, an increase in ￿nes, F, reduces the LHS and so makes it more
likely for the NCC to be satis￿ed. Hence, as one would expect, an increase in ￿nes reduces
crime.
The NCC depends on the two reference points, ync and yc, assumed ￿xed in this section.
Section 6.3 considers alternative speci￿cations of reference incomes drawing on the work
of Schmidt et al. (2008) and K￿szegi and Rabin (2006).
Proposition 9 : Assume CP with ￿xed reference points, ync and yc, and a utility function
v that is unbounded below, so that v (y1 ￿ F ￿ yc) ! ￿1 as F ! 1, ((6.2) for example).
Then, given a probability of detection, p > 0, no matter how small crime can be deterred
with a su¢ ciently high punishment, F. Thus, the Becker proposition holds under CP.
Under the conditions of Proposition 9, the Becker proposition holds under CP. The
reader might wonder if this result is due to the special assumption of ￿xed reference
points. In subsection 6.3, below, we show that the Becker proposition is robust enough to
survive a relaxation of this restriction.
6.3. Alternative speci￿cations of reference points under CP
The result (Proposition 9) in subsection 6.2, above, assumed ￿xed reference points. We
now relax this assumption. We make four assumptions, A1-A4, in this subsection.
28It is possible to have all outcomes in the domain of gains or all outcomes in the domain of losses but
this is not the case for our problem.
29In the context of tax evasion, Example 2, Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007, 2010), show that the legal
after-tax income is the unique reference point such that for all levels of declared income, the taxpayer is
in the domain of loss if caught and in the domain of gains if not caught.
30In the special case of one outcome each in the domain of gains and losses, point transformations of
probabilities coincide with cumulative transformations.
181. Assumption A1 (Hyperbolic Punishment function, HPF): The punishment function
is the hyperbolic punishment function, F = ’(p) = b=p (see De￿nition 5), where
b = y1 ￿ y0 is the bene￿t from crime to the perpetrator.
2. Assumption A2 (Power form of utility): We use the utility function in (6.2) with
￿ = ￿ (as already noted, this is consistent with the evidence and has axiomatic
foundations).
3. Assumption A3 (Standard probability weighting functions): The weighting function
w(p) is a standard weighting function (see De￿nition 8) and so lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1 (e.g., the
Prelec (1998) function, Example 5), which is consistent with the empirically observed
inverse-S shape of a probability weighting function.
4. Assumption A4 (Heterogeneity in reference points): To enable a formulation that
nests several interesting cases, we describe the reference incomes from crime and no-
crime as follows. Take the reference income from crime, yc, as the expected income
from crime, i.e.,
yc = y1 ￿ p’(p). (6.7)
The reference income from no-crime, ync, is speci￿ed as some fraction, ￿ ￿ 0, of the
reference income from crime, i.e.,
ync = ￿yc = ￿(y1 ￿ p’(p));￿ ￿ 0, (6.8)




, ￿ > 1. This is the only source of individual heterogeneity in the model.
We now analyze our model of crime when the decision maker uses CP and Assumptions
1-4 hold.
Using Assumption 1, for the HPF, ’(p) = b=p. Using (2.1) we get that
p’(p) = b = y1 ￿ y0. (6.9)
Using (6.9), the reference incomes, yc, ync, in (6.7) and (6.8) are
yc = y1 ￿ p’(p) = y0, ync = ￿yc = ￿y0. (6.10)
Thus,
y0 ￿ ync = y0 ￿ ￿y0 = (1 ￿ ￿)y0. (6.11)
Depending on the value of ￿, we get three important cases.
19(i) Socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1): In this case, from (6.11) we get
(1 ￿ ￿)y0 > 0, i.e., income relative to the reference point from not committing
the crime is positive. Such an individual feels positively rewarded on account of his
honesty.
(ii) Regretful individuals (1 < ￿ ￿ ￿): In this case (6.11) implies that (1 ￿ ￿)y0 < 0.
Such an individual experiences regret from not committing the crime and having to
forego the higher income from crime.
(iii) Individuals with reference income equal to the rational expectation of income (￿ =
1): The recent literature has suggested that the reference point could be the rational
expectation of income, which in this perfect foresight model equals the expected
income level.31 By direct calculation, the expected income from no-crime is y0 while
the expected income fromcrime is y1￿p’(p). From (6.10), this corresponds to a value
of ￿ = 1. Thus, for the case of rational expectations of income we get yc = ync = y0.
Proposition 10 : Suppose that the decision maker follows CP and Assumptions 1-4 hold.
Then the Becker proposition holds for all three kinds of decision makers, namely, socially
responsible, regretful and those who have rational expectations.
We have argued that CP is the most satisfactory decision theory among the main-
stream alternatives. It can explain everything that EU (or its variants such as generalized
expected utility) or RDU can explain but the converse is false. Proposition 10 demon-
strates the resilience of the Becker proposition even when the decision maker follows CP
and a su¢ ciently wide range of reference point behaviors is allowed for.
6.4. Loss aversion and the extent of crime
An important consideration in models of crime has been the e⁄ect of risk aversion on
the decision to commit a crime. In RDU and CP, however, one cannot infer the degree
of risk aversion simply from the magnitude of the parameter ￿ in the utility function in
(6.2). The reason is that under EU, which is characterized by linearity in probabilities, risk
attitudes are captured entirely by the shape of the utility function. For instance, under
EU, concavity of utility implies and is implied by risk aversion.
By contrast, when linearity in probabilities is relaxed, as in RDU and CP (see De￿n-
itions 9 and 12), then risk aversion is determined jointly by the shape of the probability
weighting function and the shape of the utility function. Indeed in CP it can be shown that
31See, for instance, Koszegi and Rabin (2006), Crawford and Meng (2011).
20there is a rich four-fold pattern of attitudes to risk that is supported by the evidence.32
Novemsky and Kahneman (2005) show that there is ￿no risk aversion over and above
loss aversion￿ . In other words, it is quite possible that what empirical researchers are
picking out as risk aversion is really caused by loss aversion instead.33 Therefore, it is
worth analyzing the e⁄ect of loss aversion on crime in the model that we set out above.
The individuals in our model make one of two possible decisions: To engage in the legal
activity or the illegal activity. From Proposition 10, under the conditions of the Becker
proposition (p ! 0;F ! 1), and Assumptions A1-A4, all individuals decide to opt for
the legal activity. Hence, an increase in loss aversion by making the consequences of the
illegal activity even worse, has no impact on individual decisions. In other words, as is
typically the case in mechanism design problems, we get a corner solution that entirely
eliminates crime and so many of the comparative static e⁄ects are simply zero. Therefore,
in order to isolate the impact of loss aversion we make the following assumption.
5. Assumption A5 (Punishments bounded above): We assume that for whatever reasons,
say, those mentioned in subsection 1.1 in the introduction, Fmax < 1.34 Hence, some
individuals are not dissuaded from crime.
Let us then look at the impact of the loss aversion parameter, ￿, on the three kinds of
individuals when assumptions A1, A4, A5 hold (we do not require assumptions A2, A3 for
the results in this subsection).
1. Socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1): Rewrite the NCC (8.7) as
￿ ￿ ￿S, (6.12)
where










w(p) + w(1 ￿ p)
￿1=￿
. (6.14)
If g > 0 then all individuals with 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ minf0;￿Sg will not commit the crime,
whereas all socially responsible individuals with ￿ > minf0;￿Sg will commit the
crime. It is straightforward to check that
@g
@￿ > 0. Hence, an increase in loss aversion,
32Under CP, the four-fold pattern is as follows; see Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and Kahneman and
Tversky (2000, p. 56). In the domain of gains, individuals are risk loving for small probabilities and risk
averse for larger probabilities. In the domain of losses individuals are risk loving for large probabilities
and risk averse for small probabilities.
33See also, for instance, Kahneman and Tversky (2000), Kahneman (2003), Marquis and Homer (1996)
and Rizzo and Zeckhauser (2004).
34Thus, the Becker prescription (p ! 0;F ! 1) does not hold.
21by increasing ￿S, reduces the extent of crime in society. The intuition is that an
increase in loss aversion makes the existing level of punishment even more onerous,
hence, reducing the incentive to engage in the illegal activity. If g < 0 then all
socially responsible people commit the crime anyway and an increase in ￿ has no
e⁄ect on the extent of crime for such people.
2. Regretful individuals (1 < ￿ ￿ ￿): Rewrite the NCC (8.9) as
￿ ￿ ￿R, (6.15)
where














When h > 0, all regretful individuals for whom 1 < ￿ ￿ minf￿R;￿g will not commit
the crime while all those with ￿ > ￿R will commit the crime. It is simple to check
that @h
@￿ > 0. Hence, ￿R is increasing in ￿. Therefore, as in in the case of socially
responsible individuals, an increase in loss aversion, by increasing ￿R, reduces the
extent of crime. When h < 0, all regretful individuals will commit the crime and so
an increase in loss aversion will have no e⁄ect on the extent of crime.













Then all rational individuals will commit the crime if their loss aversion is low enough
in the sense that ￿ < ￿
￿ and not commit the crime otherwise.
7. Conclusions
The Becker proposition, summarized eloquently in Kolm￿ s (1973) phrase ￿hang o⁄enders
with probability zero￿ , is a cornerstone in the ￿ economics and law￿literature and has
provided the basis for much further development of the ￿eld.
A sizeable literature addresses the Becker paradox in an expected utility (EU) framework
and considers several worthwhile extensions. We argue that it is very di¢ cult to reconcile
EU with the evidence, a well known fact, but, to our mind, not given enough prominence
in the law and economics literature. Hence, we re-examine the Becker paradox from the
22perspective of alternative mainstream non-linear decision theories that ￿t the evidence
much better than EU. These theories are as tractable as EU and equally rigorous. Two
main alternatives that we consider are rank dependent expected utility (RDU), which,
Machina (2008) describes as the most popular alternative to the EU model and cumulative
prospect theory (CP), the Nobel prize winning work of Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
The Becker proposition reemerges under RDU and CP.
When put under the lens of CP, in a standard model of crime, the Becker proposition is
robust to several plausible assumptions about the reference points of potential criminals.
We allow for heterogeneity among potential criminals in terms of their reference points,
which allows us to consider behavior that is consistent with rational expectations, regret
and social responsibility. In each case, so long as the decision maker is rational (as opposed
to being pathological) the Becker proposition holds under CP.
In addition to demonstrating that the Becker proposition holds under RDU and CP,
our paper serves two alternative purpose as well. First, we give a more satisfactory formal
account of BP. Second, we demonstrate how a standard model of crime can be analyzed
under these alternative decision theories. Our analysis gives readers a feel for the possible
problems that could be analyzed under alternative decision theories and demonstrates that
the analysis under these alternative theories is rigorous and tractable. This should give
further impetus to the emerging literature on Behavioral Law and Economics.
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8. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: For the proofs of (a) and (b) see al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2011,
Proposition 1), (c) then follows using the identity
d
dp
[TF (p;F)]F=’(p) = [TFF (p;F)’
0 (p) + TpF (p;F)]F=’(p) = 0.
Finally, (d) is an immediate consequence of (c). ￿
Proof of Lemma 1:
d
dp












































F at F = ’(p). ￿
Proof of Proposition 2: Immediate from the NCC (3.1). ￿
23Proof of Proposition 3: (a) The NCC (3.1) is clearly satis￿ed for p = 1 and F ￿
b = y1 ￿ y0. Let F = ’(p) be a di⁄erentiable punishment function. The NCC in (3.1)
continues to hold, as p declines from 1, if, and only if
d
dp




0 (y1 ￿ ’(p)) ￿ u(y1) ￿ u(y1 ￿ ’(p)). (8.2)
For the HPF (2.6), ￿p’0 (p) = ’(p), so the NCC, (8.2), becomes
NCC for HPF: u
0 (y1 ￿ ’(p)) ￿
u(y1) ￿ u(y1 ￿ ’(p))
’(p)
. (8.3)
Since the decision maker is risk averse or risk neutral, u is concave. It then follows that
the NCC (8.3) will hold for all p 2 (0;1]. This proves (a).
(b) Since ’(p) = b





dp = 1. By assumption
￿C
p > ￿C
F, thus, it follows, from Lemma 1, that d
dpC (p;’(p)) > 0. Since crime is deterred,
D(p;’(p)) = 0 (see subsection 2.1 for this assumption). Hence, T (p;’(p)) = C (p;’(p))
which implies that d
dpT (p;’(p)) > 0. Since the objective is to minimize T (p;’(p)), this
establishes part (b). ￿
Proof of Proposition 5: We omit the simple proof of part (a).











p!0(￿lnp) = 1. Since 0 < ￿ < 1, we get lim
p!0(￿lnp)








p!0e￿￿ lnp = lim
p!0p￿￿ = 1. ￿
Proof of Proposition 6: Immediate from the NCC (5.4). ￿
Proof of Proposition 7: Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, except for the following
points: (a) ’(p) = b
1￿w(1￿p) (instead of ’(p) = b





p = 1). ￿
Proof of Lemma 2: Di⁄erentiating (5.6) partially with respect to p gives ￿p(p;F) =
￿w0 (1 ￿ p)[u(y1) ￿ u(y1 ￿ F)] < 0 for all F and p. Di⁄erentiating with respect to F
gives ￿F(p;F) = ￿[1 ￿ w(1 ￿ p)]u0 (y1 ￿ F) ￿ 0, for all F and p, with ￿F(p;F) < 0 for
p > 0. ￿
Proof of Proposition 8: We make essential use of Lemma 2.
We ￿rst prove (a). Let F > b. At p = 0, ￿(0;F) = u(y1) > u(y0) so the individual
commits the crime. At p = 1, ￿(1;F) = u(y1 ￿ F) < u(y0) so the individual does not
24commit the crime. Since ￿(p;F) is continuous, there exists some pc at which ￿(pc;F) =
u(y0). Since ￿p < 0, for all p ￿ pc, ￿(pc;F) ￿ u(y0) and so individuals do not commit
the crime. For all p < pc, ￿(pc;F) > u(y0) and so individuals commit the crime.
Part (b) can be proved in an analogous manner. Let p > 0. At F = 0, ￿(p;0) = u(y1) >
u(y0), hence, all individuals commit the crime. Because u(y1 ￿ F) ! ￿1 < u(y0), as
F ! 1, no individual commits the crime for su¢ ciently large F. Since (1) ￿ is continuous,
(2) ￿(p;0) > u(y0), and (3) ￿(p;F) < u(y0) for su¢ ciently large F, there exists some
critical value Fc at which ￿(p;Fc) = u(y0). Since ￿F < 0 for F ￿ Fc, ￿(p;Fc) ￿ u(y0) and
so individuals do not commit the crime. For F < Fc, ￿(p;Fc) > u(y0) and so individuals
commit the crime. ￿
Proof of Proposition 9: Immediate from the NCC (6.6). ￿
Proof of Proposition 10: We have computed income relative to the reference point for
the legal activity in (6.11). For our model of crime, using (6.10) and Assumption 1, we
now compute the income relative to the reference point in each state from the criminal
activity. ￿
y1 ￿ ’(p) ￿ yc = b ￿ ’(p) = ￿b
1￿p
p , if caught,
y1 ￿ yc = b, if not caught.
(8.4)
From (8.4), if the criminal is not caught then income relative to the reference point is the
bene￿t, b, from the crime. If caught, this bene￿t is reduced by the amount of the ￿ne,







+ w(1 ￿ p)v(b) ￿ v (y0 (1 ￿ ￿)). (8.5)
We now use (8.5) to analyze the three cases, 0 ￿ ￿ < 1, 1 < ￿ ￿ ￿, and ￿ = 1.
1. Socially responsible individuals (0 ￿ ￿ < 1): In this case, y0 (1 ￿ ￿) > 0. Hence,




p￿ + w(1 ￿ p)b
￿ ￿ y
￿
0 (1 ￿ ￿)
￿ , (8.6)












To see if the Becker proposition holds, we take limits on both sides as p ! 0 (for
the HPF this automatically implies F = 1 as required by the Becker proposition).
From Assumption A3, lim
p!0
w(p)
p￿ = 1. From the de￿nition of a probability weighting


















Hence, as p ! 0, the inequality in (8.7) becomes






which is true. Hence, the Becker proposition holds for socially responsible individu-
als.
2. Regretful individuals (1 < ￿ ￿ ￿): In this case, y0(1 ￿ ￿) < 0. Analogous to (8.7),












Taking the limits as p ! 0 in (8.9) we get that






which is true. Hence, the Becker proposition also holds for regretful individuals.
3. Individuals with rational expectations (￿ = 1). In this case y0(1￿￿) = 0. Recalling
that v(0) = 0 (see De￿nition 11), the analogue of the NCC in (8.8), (8.10) is
￿1 + 1 < 0,
which is true. Hence, the Becker proposition also holds for individuals with rational
expectations. ￿
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